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Abstract
System logging is an essential component of building and maintaining secure systems.
Unfortunately, attackers regularly engage in anti-forensic activities after a break-in, covering
their tracks from system logs in order to frustrate the efforts of investigators. In response
to this threat, a variety of secure logging solutions have appeared in the industry and the
literature that attempt to provide tamper-resistance (e.g., Write-Once-Read-Many drives,
remote storage servers) or tamper-evidence (e.g., cryptographic integrity proofs) for system
logs. However, these approaches have not seen widespread adoption and moreover do not
address the operational requirements of system-layer auditing frameworks. As such, the vast
majority of system logs today remain vulnerable to adversarial tampering and removal.
In this thesis, we revisit the goal of secure logging within the context of standard operating
system abstractions. We introduce Custos, a comprehensive framework for the detection
and prevention of tampering in system logs. Custos enables real-time detection of log in-
tegrity violations within an enterprise-class network while being minimally invasive to the
underlying logging framework. Next, we present and validate an in-memory attack on the
integrity of auditing frameworks. Our attack exploits the intrinsically asynchronous nature
of I/O and IPC activity, demonstrating that an attacker can snatch the very evidence of
their own intrusion out of message buffers before it is securely recorded. Finally, we present
KennyLoggings, the first kernel-based tamper evident logging scheme that cryptograph-
ically secures event records at the moment of the event’s occurrence. We demonstrate that
our systems are practical and impose modest (< 10%) costs to the operating system, while
being able to detect violations even in the presence of powerful distributed adversaries.
More generally, the systems presented in this thesis dramatically mitigate the threat of a
covert anti-forensic attacker, enabling analysts to inspect a verifiable chain of custody for
forensic data. Thus, this thesis demonstrates a viable path forward to achieving trustworthy
foundations for operating system forensics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
System logging is an essential component of building and maintaining secure systems.
When security incidents occur, logs are frequently turned to as the definitive ground truth
of the system’s activities. Log auditing systems are currently experiencing a renaissance as
defenders seek out new means (e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]) of detecting and responding
to advanced persistent threats [10]. Causality analysis, which interprets logs as dependency
graphs encoding the history of system execution, has yielded novel approaches for behavior-
based intrusion and threat detection (e.g., [11, 12, 13]). These advancements are rapidly
transforming system auditing, traditionally thought of as an offline forensic exercise, into a
realtime tool that can be used to thwart the world’s next data breach [14, 15, 16].
Lost in this optimism is the reality that attackers have long known the value of system logs,
which contain incriminating evidence of their methods of intrusion, privilege escalation, and
ultimate objectives within the system. Unsurprisingly, attackers regularly engage in anti-
forensic activities to cover their tracks, including erasure and manipulation of system logs
[17, 18]. Such capabilities do not exclusively belong to nation-state adversaries; in fact, log
tampering is within reach for any would-be intruder that can read an instructional blog post
[19], launch penetration testing tools like Metasploit [20], or download a simple script [21].
In response to this threat, a variety of secure logging techniques have been proposed.
Commercial solutions involve specialized storage devices [22, 23, 24] or trusted remote servers
[25, 26], protecting the log from deletion and other unauthorized tampering. Concurrent to
these efforts, a variety of cryptographic protocols and data structures for log integrity have
been presented in the literature (e.g., [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]). Each of these solutions
exposes an interface through which individual events are at some point committed to a secure
log, at which point any adversarial tampering with them can be detected.
While these approaches show promise for constrained logging scenarios (e.g., protecting
a single application log), they exist outside of the operating system layer. As such, they
suffer from two fundamental weaknesses. First, they are not transparent when integrated
with commodity operating systems, in that they incur impractically large computational
overheads that do not scale to high volume logging scenarios, and do not account for practical
issues such as continuity across power cycles or compatibility with upstream log analysis
applications (e.g., [35]). Second, they make the implicit assumption that a log event’s
occurrence is concomitant with its commitment to the secured log; that is, these techniques
do not consider whether events could be tampered with before their commitment.
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1.1 CONTRIBUTIONS
In this thesis, we empirically demonstrate that the security and performance challenges
of tamper-evident logging on commodity operating systems render all known techniques
for secure logging presently inadequate. Further, we propose, implement and evaluate new
secure logging designs that secure the audit pipeline from the moment of log event generation
to its eventual post-mortem inspection, dramatically mitigating the threat of a covert anti-
forensic attacker. The central thesis of this work is that:
In the presence of sophisticated attackers, assured integrity for audit logs
requires integrating cryptographic primitives for tamper-evident logging into
commodity operating system software.
We demonstrate our thesis by presenting the following contributions:
Transparent Auditing Of Commodity Operating Systems. In this contribution,
we introduce Custos,1 a practical tamper-evident auditing framework that scales to the
demands of high volume logging scenarios, avoids invasive modifications to the kernel, and
is provably secure under a strong threat model. Custos is made up of two components:
1. Tamper-Evident Logger: Leveraging features of increasingly-available Trusted Ex-
ecution Environment (TEE) technologies, we present a transparent tamper-evident
logging layer for commodity audit frameworks. This logging layer guarantees that logs
are verifiably correct for all events recorded up to the moment the adversary takes full
control of the system. Our logger is judiciously optimized for performance; we show
that Custos’ secure logging protocol is three orders of magnitude faster than prior
hardware-based secure logging solutions. Further, it supports third party verifiability
of log integrity, and unlike prior work [36, 37] does not break compatibility with log
analysis applications by avoiding reliance on log encryption.
2. Real-time Decentralized Auditing: We introduce a novel decentralized auditing
scheme that enables near real-time detection of log integrity violations, thus minimizing
the window of opportunity for an attacker to remain undetected after intrusion. We
show that Custos’ auditing protocol detects log integrity violations with very high
1Custos is the Latin word for guard. It was used by the Roman poet Juvenal in the phrase “Quis custodiet
ipsos custodes?” (Satire VI, lines 347–348), translated as “Who watches the watchers?”.
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probability even in the presence of powerful distributed adversaries. In addition to real-
time tamper-detection, Custos’ decentralized audits also enable secure log replication
with parameterizable redundancy within seconds of log generation, all but eliminating
the threat of a covert anti-forensic attacker.
In-Memory Attacks and Defenses on System Auditing Frameworks. In this con-
tribution, we identify a subtle race-condition vulnerability in past approaches to secure log-
ging, and present KennyLoggings, the first tamper-evident logging system which protects
logs from such vulnerability. Specifically, this contribution consists of:
1. Race Condition Attacks on Audit Frameworks. To our knowledge, all secure
logging proposals to date rely on the implicit assumption that an event’s occurrence is
concomitant with its commitment to the secured log. That is, past techniques do not
consider the window of time in which an event (e.g., syscall) has been permitted to
proceed but whose record has not yet reached the secure logging layer. In fact, due to
the pervasive presence of asynchronous message passing in software (essential for per-
formance), such windows are ubiquitous in commodity systems. We demonstrate that
this oversight exposes a race condition vulnerability that can be exploited by an at-
tacker to undetectably snatch forensic evidence out of memory, concealing all evidence
of their intrusion. We experimentally validate the presence of this “Danger Zone” in
Linux, demonstrating its feasibility against both a local and a remote adversary. While
the efficacy of this attack relies on a backlog of existing events in the kernel log buffer,
we find that it is trivial for attackers to induce such load innocuously.
2. Tamper-Evident Logging in the Kernel. Defending against this vulnerability
would seem to call for synchronous storage of audit events to a secure log, which would
lead to catastrophic latency when considering that millions of system calls per second
can be produced by commodity operating systems [38]. Fortunately, we make the
surprising discovery that such costs are not needed to secure log events in memory; we
present KennyLoggings, a tamper-evident logging system that uses forward secure
message authentication to protect log events at the moment of their creation in kernel
memory. To our knowledge, KennyLoggings is the first kernel-based tamper-evident
logger, which is made practical through fully decoupling events’ commitment (not I/O-
bound) from their storage (I/O-bound), which has been conflated in prior work. We
demonstrate that KennyLoggings eradicates the threat of race condition attacks on
audit frameworks while imposing modest (<10%) overheads on system performance.
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide the information required to understand the secure logging
systems introduced in this thesis, as well as the race condition attack to commodity logging
frameworks. First, we cover general background on system logging and how it differs from
application logging. Next, we describe the asynchronous nature of Linux’s standard logging
framework. We then discuss the trusted execution environment technology offered by Intel
SGX. Finally, we cover prior work in areas related to this thesis.
2.1 SYSTEM LOGGING
Auditing is an indispensible aspect of computer security that dates back to the earliest
tenants of secure system design (e.g., [39]). System logs provide documentary evidence of
the sequence of activities that have affected an operating system. These records contain
information that serves to establish the type of each event, when and where it occurred,
its source and outcome and the subjects associated with it [22]. System logs differ from
application logs because they are not generated by the application code at the developer’s
will, but by the operating system itself, based on customizable rules defined by a system
administrator. System logs include records at the granularity of system calls, and are thus
capable of watching file access, recording commands run by users, and monitoring security
events and network access. Many of these events are critical for postmortem analysis after
a break-in. Recording system logs is also a legal requirement for a number of security-
related certifications [40, 41]—in Linux, the Audit Subsystem (LAuS) [42] was introduced in
version 2.6 to achieve certification under the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP)
common criteria [43]. Auditing will continue to grow in importance with the enactment of
the European Union’s GDPR [44].
2.2 LINUX AUDIT
Today, Linux Audit is the standard audit log collection system in Linux [40]. Figure 2.1
shows the architecture of Linux Audit, which consists of two main parts: a kernel component
for system call processing (kauditd), and a user-space component responsible for storing
events in the log file (auditd). The kernel component collects system call events from Linux
user space applications. When Linux Audit is enabled, every system call first goes through











Figure 2.1: System-level architecture of Linux Audit, where events related to system calls are
logged asynchronously. That is, they are appended to a buffer after their execution, and are then
processed one at a time by kauditd, which sends them from the kernel to user space for storage.
system call is then executed. Finally, if it needed to be logged, a log event is sent from the
kernel component kauditd to the user-space component auditd, which creates entries in the
log file. For performance reasons, kauditd sends events to auditd asynchronously: before
continuing with the application’s execution, log messages are only enqueued to a kernel buffer
and then processed, one by one and in a first-in-first-out manner, by a separate kauditd’s
thread that sends them from the buffer to auditd. When this backlog of events (which is of
configurable capacity) is full, kauditd can be configured to drop new events until the buffer
has space, or to handle the error by, for example, causing a kernel panic. Netlink is used
as the transmission channel between the kernel and user space. While this thesis will be
evaluated on Linux Audit, asynchronous logging mechanisms are ubiquitous and apply to
other system logging frameworks on both Linux [45, 46, 47] and Windows [48, 49, 50].
2.3 INTEL SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are a set of extensions to the x86 instruction set
architecture that allow for the creation of isolated execution environments called enclaves.
Once an enclave has been initialized, the processor ensures that any system component
outside the enclave, including the privileged software, cannot access the enclave memory
where its code and data reside. Untrusted applications can however switch into enclave mode
at pre-defined entry points and execute protected instructions inside the trusted enclave. For
an untrusted application to start executing trusted code inside the enclave, the untrusted
application needs to invoke an EENTER instruction, which performs a sequence of steps
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(e.g., load secure register context) before transitioning to enclave mode. Intel provides
wrapper code, called ecalls, to prepare the environment for an EENTER instruction [51].
Furthermore, SGX offers a sealing feature, which allows an enclave to securely persist and
retrieve secrets on the local host, even after the enclave is destroyed and restarted on the
same platform. Sealed data is confidentiality- and integrity-protected, but sealing does not
provide freshness guarantees and is vulnerable to rollback attacks. To address rollback
attacks, SGX supports monotonic counters that leverage non-volatile memory to maintain
state across different sessions. While part of this thesis uses SGX, its design is applicable
to any enclave-like interface [52], which can alternately be provided by other TEE’s such as
ARM Trustzone (e.g., [53, 54, 55]). However, the strict performance requirements of logging
rule out off-chip TEE solutions such as TPM, which are notoriously slow [56, 57, 58].
2.4 RELATED AREAS OF RESEARCH
The contributions of this work are related to a long history of research in the areas of
secure logging, attack investigation, network auditing and secure hardware.
2.4.1 Secure Logging
Cryptographic Approaches The first formalization of the secure logging problem dates
back to 1997, when Bellare and Yee [27, 59] defined the notion of forward integrity (later
called forward security) for audit logs. Logging schemes based on this model involve two
machines: a logger, generating the logs, and a verifier, determining the integrity of the
logs. To achieve forward integrity, the signing key evolves over time and used keys are
deleted from the logger, so that an adversary cannot forge proofs for log entries recorded pre-
compromise. Nonetheless, when the verifier receives log entries from the logger, it can still
derive the sequence of keys used by the logger and detect any evidence of tampering. Works
using the forward integrity model generally come in two flavors—ones that use symmetric
cryptography and ones that use asymmetric cryptography. Schemes that use symmetric
primitives [27, 59, 28, 60, 61] offer efficient proof generation costs, but need to rely on a
trusted verifier sharing a secret with the logger. In contrast, works that rely on asymmetric
primitives [29] achieve public verifiability, but incur larger computational overheads both to
generate and to verify integrity proofs.
To overcome these limitations, more recent works focused on minimizing the overhead of
the verifier through the use of sequential aggregate signatures [30, 31]. These schemes allow
“integrating” the proof of a new message into an already existing proof, authenticating all
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aggregated messages simultaneously. Unfortunately, both these schemes were shown to be
vulnerable to attacks [62]. Yavuz et al. further presented a protocol heavily optimized for
an efficient signing procedure [63]. However, this efficiency comes at the cost of an extreme
public key size (linear with the number of supported log entries). Most recently, Hartung et
al. [32] presented a scheme that combines forward-secure sequential aggregate signatures with
forward-secure signatures. However, their work still incurs impractically large computational
costs to generate proofs, making the scheme unsuitable to high-frequency system logging.
The KennyLoggings system presented in this thesis is also based on the forward in-
tegrity model. However, its tamper-evident protocol uses a simple scheme based only on
symmetric cryptographic primitives, since, as we will see, performance is one of our chief
concerns. The more sophisticated schemes described here are interoperable with our system
design, but careful vetting is required to ensure that the added overhead of these schemes
do not prohibitively degrade performance and.
System Approaches Beyond cryptographic-only approaches, prior work has proposed to
solve the secure logging problem using trusted hardware [37, 36, 64]. One of the benefits of
these approaches is their ability to protect the secrecy of signing keys even after full system
compromise. As a consequence, these approaches do not need to rely on evolving keys. While
none of these systems is suitable for in-kernel use (since the TEEs they are based on support
only Ring 3 execution), our Custos system is based on this trusted-hardware model.
Based on this model is also SGX-Log [37], However, contrarily to Custos, SGX-Log
does not allow for realtime detection of log tampering, because in its design log access and
verification rely on the particular enclave that sealed the log. Further, SGX-Log is not
transparent to the underlying logging framework because encryption breaks interoperability
with log analysis applications. Finally, SGX-Log’s per-event processing overhead is too
costly for the high-frequency nature of system logging, as we will show in Section 3.8.
Finally, the use of append-only data structures has been proposed in the literature for
storing logs in a tamper-evident fashion. These solutions include hash-based history trees [33]
and authenticated schemes such as Balloon [34]. The use case for these approaches is that
log events generated by a host can be stored in a remote untrusted server, and the data
structures provide an efficient interactive protocol to verify that an event was correctly
recorded. Our systems operate under a more aggressive threat model in which any node,
including the host itself, may be compromised. Nevertheless, these approaches can be paired
up with KennyLoggings to ensure that events were correct also at the moment of their
occurrence, and with Custos to verify that an auditor has not erased replicated logs.
7
Race Conditions Bowers et al. [65] are the first to describe the goal of securing log
events as fast as possible during a compromise before can attacker can intercept them.
This observation is similar to the one we make in KennyLoggings. However, our work
departs from theirs in several ways. The primary difference is the context of where this
race condition is taking place. In their work, the race condition occurs at the network-level,
in which a security analytics source (SAS) transmits logs in real-time to a remote trusted
server for analysis. In our work, however, the race condition occurs at the operating system
level, in which log events generated after a system call travel through an in-kernel buffer
to the logging system, and only eventually to a trusted server. Because the race condition
they consider sits at a higher level of abstraction, their solution, dubbed PillarBox, is still
vulnerable to the attack we described.
Another difference is that, in addition to log integrity, PillarBox is designed to provide
a stealth property, which conceals when the SAS has generated compromise-related alerts.
Achieving the stealth property, however, complicates their construction and introduces addi-
tional overhead to protect against traffic analysis. In our work, we only consider log integrity,
which allows us to arrive at a simple, general and more modular solution that is interoperable
with existing logging frameworks.
2.4.2 Attack Investigation
Recent years have seen resurgent interest in system auditing for threat investigation.
Using techniques pioneered by King and Chen [66], recent work has derived insights from
audit logs by parsing individual events into dependency (or provenance) graphs that allow
investigators to quickly ascertain the causal relationships between events. Various methods
have been proposed to automatically identify security insights [12, 4, 13, 11, 67, 68, 69, 70],
interpret the event stream in a way that more accurately explains application-layer semantics
[71, 1, 3, 48, 72], or to more quickly and expressively process queries on dependency graphs
[2, 73, 74, 6, 75, 76]. Such approaches are clearly improved through the assurance that
logs have not been tampered with by the adversary prior to analysis. Another significant
focus in the literature has also been to improve the cost-benefit proposition of audit logging
by removing records that are not relevant to cyber forensics [77, 78, 79, 5, 80, 81, 82]. At
first glance, the notion of compressing log streams through removal or modification of events
seems at odds with our approach, but in fact that they are complementary. Such compression
tactics can be employed on a remote server (e.g., [5]) after the log has already been verified.
Alternatively, compression functions could also be pushed down into the kernel, as was done
by Ma et al. in their ProTracer system [45], allowing event compression to take place prior
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to commitment to the tamper-evident log.
In light of the fact that they are motivated by the threat of a sophisticated attacker, it
is perhaps surprising that all of the above work fully trusts the integrity of the audit log.
The matter of log integrity has seen only limited attention in the software literature. King
and Chen’s argument for the correctness of BackTracker rested in its deployment as a VM
introspection mechanism, thus violations of kernel integrity on the monitored machine did
not violate log integrity [66]. More recently, systems such as PASS [83], LPM [46, 81], Hi-
Fi [84, 85], and CamFlow [86] advocate for an audit subsystem that satisfies Anderson’s
reference monitor guarantees [39]. The difficulty of a reference monitor based approach is
that an actual reference monitor is unattainable at this time on commodity systems due
to lack of hardware support (e.g., limited isolation rings); as a result, any common kernel
exploit is capable of disabling the reference monitor. In contrast, this thesis takes a more
grounded and practical approach to system log integrity, assuring that events cannot be
covertly modified from the moment of their occurrence to the one of their analysis.
2.4.3 Network Auditing
Adopting a similar threat model to Custos are the network forensic systems PeerRe-
view [87] and SNooPy [88], which detect faults amongst byzantine nodes participating in
a network protocol. The systems detect some faulty nodes in distributed environments,
provided that a critical mass of correct hosts still exist to witness the misbehavior. Fur-
ther, these systems only consider network events and cannot speak to the internal state of
hosts. In contrast, Custos provides tamper-evidence over considerably larger audit streams
that include both system and network events and is probabilistically guaranteed to detect
compromised nodes engaging in anti-forensic activities.
2.4.4 Secure Hardware
Several works have leveraged the isolation guarantees of of Intel SGX [89, 90] to protect
user-level applications across domains. Representative systems that focused on “shielding”
applications in SGX enclaves are Haven [91] for a lightweight OS, SCONE [92] for Docker
containers and Panoply [93] for POSIX interface threads. Glamdring [94] further proposed
a framework to semi-automatically partition applications to only run security-sensitive code
within enclaves. Rather than securing entire applications, we will show that the goal of Cus-
tos is to secure system logs, thus minimizing the TCB to a small set of critical components.
Intel SGX has also served to enable applications that were either not possible or not
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practical otherwise, including secure multi-party computation [95], functional encryption
[96], oblivious machine learning [97], integrity assurance for Internet services [98], secure
databases [99], privacy preserving cloud computing [100], secure MapReduce computations
[101, 102] and access delegation [103]. Analogously to these works, Custos leverages secure
hardware to enable an application (tamper evident auditing) to operate under a stronger
threat model that was previously possible.
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Chapter 3: Transparent Auditing Of Commodity Operating Systems
In this chapter we present Custos, a practical tamper-evident auditing framework that
scales to the demands of high volume logging scenarios, avoids invasive modifications to the
kernel and is provably secure against a strong attacker model.
3.1 GOALS AND THREAT MODEL
3.1.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
This work envisions a large organizational environment, comprised of upwards of thou-
sands of machines, that is the target of a sophisticated and well-funded adversary. The
adversary’s attack pattern follows the APT lifecycle model [13]: after an initial compromise
grants unprivileged access to a host, the attacker establishes persistence and then escalates
privilege in order to achieve full system compromise, at which point they have full con-
trol of the operating system, and can engage in anti-forensic measures (e.g., log tampering
[20, 21, 19]) in order to hide their presence and move laterally to other hosts in the network.
We assume that each host in the network is equipped with a TEE such as Intel SGX that
can confidentially store cryptographic keys. We also assume that the implementations of the
cryptographic functions used inside the TEE are side-channel free, meaning that they do not
exhibit secret-dependent memory accesses that can leak the signing key.1 We also make the
usual assumptions that it is not feasible for an adversary to forge digital signatures or find
collisions in cryptographic hash functions. Finally, we assume that the organization employs
a system administrator or cyber analyst that maintains a standard key management service
(KMS) and can receive and respond to security alerts.
3.1.2 Design Goals
We set out to design a system that satisfies the following properties:
G1 Tamper-Evident Logs. The auditing system must record log entries with provable
integrity such that forgeries, omissions, and other forms of tampering can be detected.
1Custos’ security in the context of micro-architectual side channels reduces to software in the TEE being
able to protect secret keys during cryptographic routines (e.g., when calculating digital signatures), which
is a well-studied and orthogonal problem [104, 105, 106, 107].
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That is, after achieving full system compromise, an adversary should not be able to
undetectably manipulate log messages recorded pre-compromise.
G2 Third-Party Verifiability. Log verifiability should not depend on a single machine
or a fully trusted verifier. In forensic investigations, third parties (e.g. Court agents
[108, 109]) should be able to verify the correctness and authenticity of a given set of
logs without being granted other privileges in the system (e.g., access to secret keys).
G3 Fine-Grained Audits. The system must support verification of arbitrary subsets of
log entries without the need to possess the entire log history. This property permits
audits over a specific time span of interest. Further, it aids attack reconstruction by
attributing integrity violations to a specific time span in the log history.
G4 Tamper-Resistant Logs. In addition to detecting violations of log integrity, the
system should provide strong assurance of log availability. Specifically, the system
should protect historic log data describing the events leading up to full compromise
from erasure.
G5 Minimally Invasive. The system must interoperate with commodity auditing frame-
works, avoid changes to the underlying OS, work efficiently enough to be deployed on
systems under heavy load, and preserve compatibility with upstream log analysis ap-
plications.
3.1.3 Challenges
Providing the above properties is challenging given the threat model described above.
Prior designs fall short of achieving them by trading off performance or security. For example,
forward-secure schemes based on the notion of epochs [30, 27, 61, 29] achieve full tamper-
evidence only when configured to generate proofs of integrity at the granularity of one
log event (epoch = 1), but this does not scale. When configured to generate proofs of
integrity at the granularity of epoch = n log events, the most recent entries remain vulnerable
to tampering. While the aid of trusted hardware can help overcome these security issues
[37, 36, 64], it is not a panacea—interacting with a TEE still requires addressing attack
vectors such as rollback attacks and protocol termination attacks, and accounting for these
issues often leads to large computational overheads [100, 110]. Due to these challenges, no












Figure 3.1: Overview of Custos’ components. Each block represents a host. Hosts record
logs using Custos’ Logger. A) shows a centralized auditing scenario, where one central server
(Auditor) audits the logs of other hosts and reports violations to the system administrator. B)
shows a decentralized auditing scenario where logging hosts also run Custos’ Auditor component
and audit each other in a peer-to-peer fashion.
3.2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This section provides an overview of Custos’ components. A diagram of these compo-
nents is provided in Figure 3.1.
Tamper-Evident Logger (§3.3) As log events are generated by an underlying audit
framework, they are processed by a user space daemon that is minimally-modified to generate
efficient iterative proofs of log integrity. The code and data (keys) responsible for producing
these proofs are partitioned from the rest of the daemon and executed within an enclave.
To minimize the overhead to the underlying audit framework, the Logger employs a batch
signature scheme, and generates proofs of integrity offline from the logging operation. For
proof verification, the Logger publishes its public key, which is bound to the identity of
the enclave.
Centralized Auditing (§3.4) The prevailing common practice for logging in large orga-
nizations is to transmit log events to a central storage server. We introduce two auditing
protocols for Custos, the first of which is designed for this environment. The central server
(Auditor) obtains logs and associated integrity proofs from a host by issuing an audit
challenge to it. The Logger prepares a signed response to the challenge that includes the
log data and associated proofs. The Auditor attempts to validate the response, sending a
security alert to the administrator if the audit fails.
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Table 3.1: Summary of notation and semantics for Custos’ protocols.
Notation Description
H An incremental cryptographic hash-function with methods Init, Update, Final.
Init() initializes and returns a hash context. Update(hash, data) updates the
hash context hash with data. Final(hash) generates the hash digest h(hash).
Σ A digital signature scheme with methods KeyGen, Sign, Verify. KeyGen()
generates an asymmetric key pair 〈k−, k+〉, with k− private key and k+
public key. Sign(k−, x) generates σk−(x) by signing message x with k
−.
Verify(k+, x, σk−(x)) returns true if σk−(x) is a valid signature over x made
with k−, false otherwise.
〈l−, l+〉 Uniquely-identifying keypair for Custos instance. Generated with Σ.
Me Ordered set of non-overlapping consecutive log entries belonging to a block with
unique ID e.
Seal(in, out) TEE function. Seals the given input data in into the encrypted output data out.
Unseal(in, out) TEE function. Attempts to unseal the given encrypted input data in into the
output data out. Returns −1 if the unsealing fails (e.g. the sealed data was
tampered with).
CreateMC() TEE function. Initializes a monotonic counter with ID mcID and value mc = 0.
Returns the tuple 〈mcID,mc〉.
IncrementMC(mcID) TEE function. Increments the value of the monotonic counter with ID mcID.
ReadMC(mcID) TEE function. Reads and returns the value of the monotonic counter with ID
mcID.
Decentralized Auditing (§3.5) A centralized log server creates a single point of failure—
APTs regularly target administrative credentials and could therefore conceivably access the
log server. Thus, centralized auditing jeopardizes G4 and also creates scalability issues.
To address these limitations, we present a decentralized variant of our audit protocol that
enables distributed storage and verification of logs. Here, all network nodes include an Au-
ditor component running inside the enclave of the host. The Auditor randomly initiates
audit challenges with a parameterizable number of its peers over a specified time period.
Our protocols further support log replication with parameterizable redundancy and include
a parallelized log reconstruction algorithm.
3.3 TAMPER-EVIDENT LOGGER
We now describe Custos’ tamper evident logging protocol in five routines: (1) Initial-
ization; (2) Startup; (3) Logging; (4) Commitment; (5) Shutdown. Each of these routines
corresponds to a call to the Logger application running inside the enclave. Table 3.1
explains the notation used in our descriptions.
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Algorithm 3.1: Initialization Phase
Output: sealed-key-id , sealed-e





Algorithm 3.2: Startup Phase
Input: sealed-key-id , sealed-e
ret1 ← Unseal(sealed-key-id , 〈l−,mcID〉);
if ret1 == −1 then
raise an error;
restart with initialization phase;
mc ← ReadMC(mcID);
ret2 ← Unseal(sealed-e, 〈e‖mce‖mcIDe〉);
if ret2 == −1 ∨mce 6= mc ∨mcIDe 6= mcID then
raise an error;
restart with initialization phase;
IncrementMC(mcID);
hash ← H.Init(); }
StartNewBlock()
e ← e + 1;
Initialization phase Algorithm 3.1 shows the steps of the initialization phase, used when
Custos is first deployed on the host. This phase starts with creating an asymmetric key
pair 〈l−, l+〉 for the new Logger instance. Next, the TEE is used to initialize a new monotonic
counter with UUID and value 〈mcID,mc〉, respectively, and the block ID e is initialized to
zero. The TEE is then used to seal these values so that they can be securely stored on disk;
they will be unsealed by the Logger in its startup phase.
Startup phase Algorithm 3.2 describes the startup phase, which is invoked once per host
startup. This phase starts with unsealing the previously sealed key, monotonic counter,
and block ID. In case of any missing or corrupted data, an error is raised and the enclave
is forced to run a new initialization routine. The Logger then increments the value of the
monotonic counter to mark the beginning of a new session. Finally, a new block is started
and an incremental hash is initialized. The Logger maintains the key, monotonic counter,
block ID, and incremental hash in enclave-protected memory throughout its execution until
the shutdown phase is invoked. Once this phase is complete, the Logger is ready to receive
log events from the underlying audit framework.
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Algorithm 3.3: Logging Phase
Input: A log message m
H.Update(hash, m); // extend the hash






σl−(h(Me)) ← Σ.Sign(l−, h(Me))
StartNewBlock();
Algorithm 3.5: Shutdown Phase
Output: sealed-e, e, σl−(h(Me))
CompleteBlock();
Seal(〈e‖mc‖mcID〉, sealed-e);
Logging phase Algorithm 3.3 shows the the logging phase, which is invoked whenever
the audit framework produces a new log event. This phase consists of extending the current
block’s hash value with the new log event.
Commitment phase The Logger’s commitment phase, shown in Algorithm 3.4, is invoked
when an auditor initiates a log audit. In this phase, the Logger signs the incremental hash
that has been generated over the current block of logs, then releases the resulting signature
to the auditor. Finally, a new block is started. Notice that the size of each block depends
on the frequency of the audits.
Shutdown phase Upon receiving a shutdown notification, the Logger must complete the
current block (regardless of whether an audit challenge was received) and seal the current
block ID e together with the current value and ID of the monotonic counter. Algorithm 3.5
describes this process. This phase ensures that (1) all log entries up to the moment of
shutdown are successfully signed and (2) when the Logger is started up again it can continue
with block ID e+ 1.
3.4 CENTRALIZED AUDITING
In large organizations, it is common practice to periodically transmit system logs to a
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Figure 3.2: Protocol summary of an audit. The Auditor initiates an audit challenge between
blocks b1 and b2. The Logger transmits the inclusive range of log events between the IDs with their
associated integrity proofs. The Auditor notifies the Logger of the result after verifying the logs.
by Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) products or retained for forensic
analysis. In this section, we demonstrate how Custos can be incorporated into this workflow
to ensure that logs were not manipulated between capture and transmission. An overview
of the network protocol can be found in Figure 3.2. The procedure works as follows:
1. The central storage server (Auditor) initiates an audit challenge to the Logger by identi-
fying a range of log blocks to audit. In Figure 3.2, the Auditor is interested in storing and
verifying the most recent blocks of logs. In particular, because the Auditor has previously
verified all blocks Mi, i ≤ e − 3, it initiates an audit for the range e − 2 to the present
block (Ø). Each audit challenge message includes a challenge ID, cID, which is a nonce.
2. The challenge is received by the untrusted component of the Logger. Next, it is passed
to the enclave, which verifies that the challenge is valid and that cID has not been used
before. It then translates b2 to the present block and determines that it is necessary to
commit Me. Next, it receives from the untrusted component a copy of the requested
log blocks (Mb1 , . . . ,Mb2) and proofs (σl−(Mb1), . . . , σl−(Mb2)), and produces a signature
σl−(〈cID, b1, b2,Mb1 , σl−(Mb1), . . . ,Mb2 , σl−(Mb2)〉). The untrusted Logger then transmits
the blocks, the proofs and the generated signature as a response to the Auditor.
3. The Auditor validates the Logger’s response signature and then iteratively verifies the
integrity proof for each log block. If successful, the Auditor stores the logs and proofs,
and updates its record of the last verified block for this Logger from e − 3 to e. It also
notifies the Logger of the successful result ; this message will become relevant when we
introduce the decentralized version of the protocol. If verification fails, the Auditor will
raise an alert to notify the administrator of an incorrect Logger.
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Table 3.2: Parameters for decentralized audits, controlled by administrative policy and can be
different for each participating node.
Description
T Frequency with which a node initiates a round of audit challenges.
w Number of audit challenges that a node sends during each round.
µ Timeout to receive a response in the protocol; must be less than T .
r Number of nodes where each log block needs to be replicated.
3.5 DECENTRALIZED AUDITING
A centralized auditing strategy is problematic when considering a sophisticated attacker.
Although centralized auditing retains a copy of logs off of the (potentially compromised)
host, its log server represents a single point of failure. As a result, a viable attack strategy
against centralized Custos would be for the adversary to participate in the auditing protocol
to avoid detection, then attempt to compromise the log server. Once the log server is
compromised, the adversary can engage in the same anti-forensic activities that they would
have otherwise conducted on the host.
In this section, we address this limitation through a decentralized auditing strategy com-
prised of 3 principal components: (1) we now place a enclave-protected Trusted Auditor
application in each host within the organization’s network; (2) the Trusted Auditor is re-
sponsible for administering Decentralized Audit Challenges in concert with the other nodes in
the network; (3) as this protocol results in the distributed replication of log blocks throughout
the network, a Distributed Log Reconstruction mechanism is provided that allows adminis-
trators to query a forensic record of events on a particular host over a given timespan.
Trusted Auditor When first initialized, the Trusted Auditor is provided a set of param-
eters (summarized in Table 3.2) that govern its behavior. They include the frequency with
which to launch a round of audit challenges (T ), the number of nodes to challenge in each
round (w), and a timeout value µ that the auditor should wait on a challenge response before
declaring failure. These values can be fixed across all nodes or can vary from node-to-node.
Additionally, we introduce a new parameter r for the Tamper-Evident Logger component,
which specifies the number of nodes upon which each of its log blocks should be replicated.
In our implementation, the Tamper-Evident Logger and Trusted Auditor components run
in the same process space and share the same identity keypair. For clarity, we will use the
notation 〈a−, a+〉 to denote a host performing the Auditor role and 〈l−, l+〉 to denote a host










































Figure 3.3: System-layer diagram of an audit. The protocol messages in Figure 3.2 correspond in
this diagram to events 3, 9, and 15, respectively. The functionalities running inside the TEE are
limited to generating protocol messages, verifying message authenticity and updating the enclave
state in response to successful audits.
Decentralized Audit Challenges The decentralized auditing variant builds on the same
audit challenge protocol used in the centralized version; Figure 3.3 shows a system-layer
diagram of how the audit challenge flows through the trusted and untrusted components of
two nodes, one in the Auditor role and one in the Logger role. The decentralized protocol
wraps the audit challenge protocol as follows:
1. Every T , the Auditor selects w nodes uniformly at random. It then issues to each node
an audit challenge over (b1 = ∗, b2 = ∗), which are wildcards to be resolved by the Logger
according to its replication needs. (Fig 3.3, 1 - 3 ).
2. Each Logger responds to the audit challenge in the same manner described above. The
Logger always commits and returns the most recent log block (i.e., b2 = e); it will adjust
b1 to include additional historic blocks that have not yet been replicated r times if the
they have not been sent to that Auditor before. (Fig 3.3, 4 - 9 ).
3. Upon receiving a response, the Auditor checks that the response is valid (i.e., signed) and
then verifies the log integrity proofs (Fig 3.3, 10 - 13 ). If the response is invalid or the Log-
ger does not respond within µ, the Auditor alerts the administrator of a failed challenge.
If the response is valid but log verification fails, the Auditor alerts the administrator that
the challenged node is compromised.
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Algorithm 3.6: Decentralized log reconstruction. Min returns the minimum
value in a set, Request retrieves node t’s log block Mi from node n, Sum sums
the values in a set, and ResponseCallback executes when node n’s responses to
Request arrives.
Function LogRetrieve(node t, blockid s, blockid e, report G)
Logs ← []
ReqCounts ← [∀n∈N , 0]
for i between (s, e) do
Locations ← G[t][i]
n← l ∈ Locations, s.t. ∀k ∈ Locations
ReqCounts[k] ≥ ReqCounts[l];
Request(n, t, i, ResponseCallback)
ReqCounts[n] ← ReqCounts[n] + 1
while Sum(ReqCounts) > 0 do
Wait
return Logs
Function ResponseCallback(node n, blockid i, block M)
Logs[i] ← M
ReqCounts[n] ← ReqCounts[n] − 1
4. If both response and log integrity were valid, the Auditor returns a confirmation to the
Logger that the log was verified and replicated (Fig 3.3, 14 - 18 ). If such confirmation
is valid, the Logger updates its replication count for the audited blocks. If no valid
confirmation is received within µ, the Logger discards the challenge. The result of each
audit is also mirrored to an administrative machine for accounting purposes.
Distributed Log Reconstruction Decentralized auditing prevents the log storage server
from becoming a central point of failure; in the steady state of the protocol, each node’s
logs will be stored with r redundancy at different remote nodes in the network. However,
decentralized storage also complicates the matter of inspecting the logs during post-mortem
investigations. To address that, we present the following algorithm that enables parallelized
reconstruction of a target node’s log history at a single point in the network. To begin,
the administrator compiles the results of each audit challenge into a Global State Report
(G). G tracks the integrity state of each node’s logs over time, but also indexes where each
log block has been replicated. To reconstruct a target node t’s logs over a block range
s to e, the administrator invokes the LogRetrieve function, shown in Algorithm 3.6.
This function parallelizes retrieval of logs across the available nodes in G. To maximize
throughput, the function tracks which nodes are currently fielding requests on other blocks
and minimizes the number of outstanding requests to the same node. While omitted for
brevity, LogRetrieve also supports recovery from request timeouts and invalid responses,
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and ResponseCallback verifies t’s signature over block Mi as in the original audit.
3.6 IMPLEMENTATION
We implement Custos in C for Linux Audit 2.8.2. In particular, we extend the auditd
user space daemon [111] to be integrated with an Intel SGX enclave that supports all of
Custos’ trusted logging and auditing functionalities. Our implementation consists of 2,254
lines of code (excluding Makefiles, comments and blank lines), of which 658 run inside
the SGX enclave. The TEE functions required by our design are provided by SGX and the
monotonic counter used by the Logger is an SGX-managed hardware counter. We use SGX’s
trusted cryptography library [112] to compute hashes (with SHA-256) and digital signatures
(with ECDSA), and the TPL library [113] to serialize messages before network transfer. It
should be noted that, even though we only implemented it on top of Linux Audit, Custos
is designed to be neutral to the underlying audit framework.
3.7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now explain how Custos assures the intended security and design goals. The cor-
rectness of G1 (tamper-evident logs) can be evaluated by enumerating the space of attacks
against the Logger. For simplicity, we assume here that a centralized audit has been issued
from block zero to the present.
• Historic Event Deletion. An attacker cannot delete arbitrary events from a node’s historic
log records. Removing a subset of events from a block will invalidate its integrity proof,
which cannot be forged. Attempting to remove an entire block will invalidate the response,
which cannot be forged. A Truncation Attack on the log will similarly be detected by
validating the response. This is because all protocol messages are processed inside an
enclave, which protects cryptographic keys from the untrusted node.
• Historic Event Tampering. An attacker cannot insert or modify events into a commit-
ted log block without invalidating its integrity proof. An attacker also cannot re-order
blocks because the trusted component of the Logger signs over the chronologically-ordered
challenge response.
• Protocol Termination. An attacker with root privilege is able to terminate the Logger pro-
cess at any time. An attacker may use this ability to try to prevent a block’s commitment
by terminating the Logger, but will then need to restart the Logger so it can respond to
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future challenges. Because the current block is committed during the Shutdown Phase,
the attacker will have to force kill the process. However, if the attacker does so then there
will not be a sealed-e on disk that will unlock to the enclave’s current configuration (recall
that mcID is a hardware counter that is incremented in the Startup Phase). Because the
attacker cannot forge sealed-e, the Logger will raise an error and regenerate its parameters,
which will be detected on the next audit. By the same logic, the attacker is unable to
launch Rollback Attacks while the Logger is shutdown because this will cause parameter
unsealing to fail during the Startup Phase.
Custos satisfies G2 (third-party verifiability) by having each node publish its public key
after initialization. This key can be used to verify any log blocks produced by the node in
an online challenge or an offline (e.g., third party-related) audit. Recall that it is necessary
for the organization to deploy a key management service for nodes’ public keys.
Our system facilitates G3 (fine-grained audits) by permitting audit challenges over ranges
of log blocks. The number of log events in a block varies with the workload of the system;
however, the administrator can exert control over the size of blocks by tuning the parameters
T and w. This is because a block is guaranteed to be committed each time a node receives
an audit challenge. Because audits are fine-grained, our protocols can also be used to issue
proof-of-retrievability challenges on historic log blocks that have previously been verified.
Custos pursues goal G4 (tamper-resistant logs) by replicating logs at multiple remote
locations during the decentralized auditing. The security of this goal can then be analyzed
by enumerating the space of attacks against the decentralized auditing protocol. Let v be a
compromised node that seeks to conceal events contained in block Me. We have previously
established that v will be detected if they fail to reply to an audit challenge for Me within
µ seconds, and v cannot forge a valid response over tampered logs.
• Malicious Auditor Role. Until v is detected through an audit challenge, they may attempt
to lie about an honest node’s correctness to inject confusion into audit results. This would
require v to be able to generate a result message that implicates the honest node, but
this is not possible because the trusted Auditor component will only generate a result
message when presented with an valid authenticated audit response. Because v cannot
forge the result message, it is not in their interest to lie about the honest node.
• Colluding Auditors. Multiple compromised nodes may attempt to collude in the decen-
tralized audit to conceal their presence. A second dishonest node k cannot force an audit
challenge to v, but may randomly select v. Because the untrusted environment controls
network transmission, k could then drop the result message that implicates v. However,
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Table 3.3: Probability ε that a compromised node v is not audited by any honest node under
varying configurations of N , r and f . N + 1 is the total number of nodes participating in the































50 5.38× 10−2 2.449× 10−1 3.74× 10−4 2.51× 10−2
100 3.23× 10−3 5.87× 10−2 1.89× 10−7 5.93× 10−4
200 9.74× 10−6 3.38× 10−3 2.92× 10−14 3.32× 10−7
this would only delay the detection of v, whose Logger would attempt to transmit Me
again in future challenges since k did not confirm its replication. More shrewdly, v and k
could both comply with the audit, then immediately delete both copies of Me. Because
v’s trusted Logger component received a valid result from k, it may conclude that Me
was replicated r times and stop transmitting it in future challenges. G4 thus depends on
the probability that v receives consecutive challenges by r malicious nodes and no honest
nodes. We demonstrate that this probability is negligible in Section 3.7.1.
Finally, Custos satisfies G5 (minimally invasive) in that it is fully interoperable with any
upstream applications that process Linux Audit events. Custos runs in the process space
of auditd, but its semantics are independent of the existing audit-userspace code base. In
fact, Custos inserts just 26 lines of code into existing audit-userspace source files. This
makes porting Custos to new versions extremely simple. In addition, while we described
Custos in the scenario of online auditing frameworks, we note that a Custos’ Logger
could easily be extended to automatically generate integrity proofs offline at predefined time
intervals or block sizes, without interaction with any external party.
3.7.1 Probabilistic Analysis
Let v be a compromised node that seeks to conceal events contained in block Me. We
now analyze the probability that v succeeds in its mission without being reported, in the
presence of a distributed adversary. Let N + 1 be the number of nodes participating in the
protocol and f + 1 be the number of compromised colluding nodes, including v. v’s enclave
will attempt to replicate Me to r auditors, in the order of challenge arrival. v can re-order
challenges before passing them to the enclave so long as they are responded to within µ.
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Scenario A Suppose v receives r consecutive audit challenges from colluding compromised
auditors and no challenges from honest auditors. This is the best case scenario for the
adversary as v does not even need to re-order challenges. The first challenge arrives from a
colluding node with probability f
N
. Given that, the second challenge arrives from a different
colluding node with probability f−1













f − r + 1












where the notation nPr refers to k-permutations of n. Table 3.3 computes the value of this
probability for different configurations. When N = 100, even with f = 50 compromised
auditors, it suffices to choose r = 4 to have ε < 5.88%.
Scenario B Let us consider the case when v re-orders challenges to keep the enclave from
processing an honest node’s challenge. Assume that v has received β < r challenges from
distinct colluding nodes and it is waiting for other (r − β) challenges to arrive from other
distinct colluding nodes. The probability of this happening is fPβ/
NPβ, using the same
method as in Scenario A The (β + 1)-th challenge will arrive from an honest auditor with
probability N−f





· N − f
N − β
(3.2)
If v chooses to delay the honest challenge while waiting for r − β dishonest challenges, the
dishonest challenges must arrive within µ before v is detected by the honest node.
We can assume that the number of challenge arrivals per unit of time follows a Poisson
distribution [114]; this is because at every T the auditors send challenges to nodes randomly
and thus challenges are sent to v independently of one another. Let λ be the average rate of
challenge arrival and X be the random variable representing number of challenges arriving at
v within the time interval. If we observe the system from the perspective of v for a long time
T , the total number of audit challenges generated will be T
T
· N . There is a probability w
N
that v gets selected for each of those challenges. Therefore, the average number of challenges
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Now we calculate the probability P3 that, among m challenges received by v, at least
(r−β) of them are from new colluding nodes. For exactly y auditors to be colluding among
these m, distinct y nodes are chosen from remaining f −β colluding nodes, and m−y nodes
are chosen from remaining N − f − 1 honest nodes. Let random variable Y denote the
number of colluding auditors among m. The probability P (Y = y) will be calculated as:
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P (Y = y) (3.5)
Therefore, the probability that at least r−β of the m challenges are from remaining colluding
nodes is 1−P3. If v receives m challenges within µ after an honest node b’s challenge arrival,
the probability that at least (r − β) among the m challenges are from distinct colluding
nodes is P2 · (1− P3). Since X follows a Poisson distribution, the cumulative probability P
for any m in this scenario will be:




The distributed adversary will be in the least advantageous position if the first of the r
challenges is from an honest auditor b, and to avoid detection, v has to wait for r colluding
challenges within µ, that is β = 0. The best case scenario for the adversary now is when
challenge from b arrives after β = r − 1 challenges from colluding auditors. In this case, v
only needs one more challenge from a colluding node to conceal detection of its tampering
to block Me. Even in the best case scenario, v will be able to avoid detection only with
probability 4.43% where N = 100, f = 50, r = 4, w = 10, µ = 15 s and T = 60 s.
3.8 EVALUATION
We now characterize the performance of Custos. To do so, we leverage two experimental
setups. In both, we configured Linux Audit to log all forensically-relevant system calls, using
the same ruleset employed in [115, 116, 1].
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• Point-to-point Setup (Bare Metal): We deployed a Logger Instance on a server with
an Intel Core i7-7700K CPU at 4.20 GHz (4 physical cores) and 64 GB RAM running
Ubuntu Server 18.04 64 bit (Linux 4.15). We deployed an Auditor on a different server
with an Intel Xeon E5-2630 v4 CPU at 2.20 GHz (10 physical cores) and 64 GB RAM
running Ubuntu Server 16.04 64 bit (Linux 4.4). The Logger used SGX SDK version 2.3.1
with debug mode on, while the Auditor used the same version in simulation mode. During
experimentation, we observed an average latency of 176 µs between the two machines.
• Distributed Setup (VMs): We deployed Custos on a cluster of 100 Amazon EC2
m4.xlarge instances, each with 4 VCPUs (2.3 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2686 v4 or 2.4 GHz
Intel Xeon E5-2676 v3) and 16 GB of RAM. Each instance was running Ubuntu Server
18.04 64 bit (Linux 4.15) and used SGX SDK version 2.3.1 in simulation mode. A small
script synthesized a constant workload that generated an average of 32 log events (11.8
KB of data) per second on each node, which Ma et al. report as the average logging rate
of a web server under realistic conditions [45]. During experimentation, we observed an
average latency of 169 µs between any two machines in the cluster.
Logger Microbenchmarks We start by using the bare metal setup to measure the time
that Custos’ Logger takes to perform each of the five phases described in Section 3.3. We do
so by manually invoking each Logger’s operation 500 times, including in the measurement the
time required to context switch into and out of the enclave. Table 4.3 shows the results. The
phases that involve interaction with a hardware counter, Initialization and Startup, are the
most costly. This is because SGX monotonic counter operations are notoriously slow [110],
but these operations typically occur only once per session. The next most costly phases,
Commitment and Shutdown, involve cryptographic signatures. However, these operations
are a function of challenge frequency, not the workload, and in practice will occur orders of
magnitude less frequently than the Logging operation. Fortunately, Logging (ecalls) is the
most efficient phase at 4.71 µs per event processed, but the performance of this operation is
paramount. Hypothesizing that the main cost of this operation is switching context between
the untrusted OS and the trusted enclave [100], we created a second Logging implementation
using Hotcalls, which were recently introduced by Weisse et al. [117]. Using Hotcalls gives
us the same security guarantees of ecalls, but it allows us to achieve a significant speed-up
(0.92 µs), at the expense of running an additional background thread in Custos. For the
rest of our evaluation, we will use the Hotcalls-based implementation of Custos. In Section
3.8, we will evaluate the system-wide impact of this choice.
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Table 3.4: Microbenchmarks on Logger operations. We report the median execution times over
500 runs, including results for Logging phase using both ecalls and Hotcalls. We compare to SGX-
Log [37] and a TPM2 [118] logger (same log messages), as well as BGLS signatures [62] (smaller
fixed size messages).
Phase Custos SGX-Log TPM2 BGLS
Initialization 94.55 ms – – –
Startup 109.10 ms – – –
Logging 4.71 µs 0.80 ms 20 ms 31.89 ms
Logging (Hotcalls) 0.92 µs 0.79 ms – –
Commitment 128.87 µs – 734 ms –
Shutdown 188.98 µs – – –
Prior Work Comparison: We have argued that prior solutions for tamper-evident logging
do not meet the needs of operating systems. To validate this assertion, we perform a direct
comparison of Custos to prior work: SGX-Log [37, 119], a logger based on the TPM2 hard-
ware’s extend (Logging Phase) and quote (Commit Phase) operations [118], and Hartung
et al.’s scheme based on BGLS signatures [32]. For SGX-Log and BGLS, we conservatively
set highly-favorable parameters for performance.2 We focus on the critical Logging phase,
which dominates performance cost. SGX-Log (based on the same trusted hardware) takes a
median time of 0.80 ms (ecalls) and 0.79 ms (Hotcalls), TPM extend operations take 20 ms,
and the BGLS-based scheme takes 31.89 ms. Thus, Custos outperforms existing solutions
by three to five orders of magnitude. Further, the TPM implementation requires a quote
operation to produce a proof, adding an additional median cost of 734 ms per block.
Vanilla Linux Comparison: Finally, we instrument auditd to measure the average times
in nanoseconds that (insecure) Vanilla Linux Audit takes process a single event as compared
to Custos. After observing the processing of 40,000 identical log events, we discover that
Custos-enabled auditd takes an average of 6.61 µs/event whereas Vanilla auditd takes an
average of 5.67 µs/event. Custos thus imposes an average 16.6% overhead on auditd. Note
that this reported overhead is conservative in that our measurement did not capture the time
required for auditd to flush events to disk, making the overhead imposed by Custos lower
in practice. We conclude that Custos’ tamper-evident logging protocol imposes reasonable
overheads on Linux Audit’s log processing time.
2We configured SGX-Log to use a block-size of 1000 log messages, to avoid including in our measurement
the impact of its sealing phase, and we configured the BGLS-based scheme with n = 1000 and l = 1000.
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Table 3.5: Application benchmark results. We report the medians over 10 runs. For httpd and
NGINX, we used apache bench [120] configured to send 100,000 requests from a single thread and
output the average time per request. For Redis, we used the built-in redis-benchmark configured
to send 250,000 requests from a single thread and output the average time per request. We ran the
Blast benchmark in two configurations: first, limiting it to one thread only; second, letting it use
all the CPU threads available.
Test Type Vanilla Custos Overhead
nginx 72 µs 73 µs 1.39%
apache2 75 µs 76 µs 1.33%
redis 23,520 ns 23,932 ns 1.75%
blast 938.641 s 954.104 s 1.65%
blast-multicore 222.791 s 237.027 s 6.39%
Logger Macrobenchmarks To evaluate the system-wide impact of Custos on realistic
workloads, we again use the point-to-point setup to measure the performance of a series
of application benchmarks while running Custos in the background. In particular, we
benchmark three server applications (httpd [121], NGINX [122] and Redis [123]) and one
scientific-computing application (Blast [124]). We note that given our intensive configuration
of Linux Audit, we were unable to run classic OS benchmark suites including UnixBench
[125] and LMBench [126] against Vanilla Linux Audit,3 and hence are unable to use for
Custos.
We run each benchmark 10 times and report the results in Table 4.4. The time overheads
of Custos in the first four benchmarks are all under 2%. This is because Custos does
not add cycles to the execution of any system processes besides auditd, which runs asyn-
chronously from the processes that the audit stream describes. The overhead we do observe
here is likely the result of auditd interacting with the Architectural Enclave Service Manager
service (aesmd) and running an additional background thread to enable Hotcalls. However,
even when the system utilizes all CPU resources, which is the case in the blast-multicore
benchmark, Custos’ overhead remains at a reasonable 6.39%. We conclude that Custos’
tamper-evidence extensions to Linux Audit impose acceptable system performance costs.
Centralized Auditing We next use the point-to-point setup to characterize the raw cost
of a single audit challenge. Intuitively, we expect the cost of an audit challenge to be domi-
nated by the time required to transmit and process log data, which are orders of magnitude
3Linux Audit is prone to overflowing its event buffer under heavy system loads when configured for
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Figure 3.4: Time required by an auditor to complete an audit challenge by number of logs in the
response. The cost of an audit challenge grows linearly with the size of the response.
larger than Custos’ protocol messages. We measure the end-to-end time required by audits
from the perspective of the Auditor, which spans the moment of challenge generation to the
moment of result transmission (Fig. 3.3, 2 - 15 ), while varying the number of logs trans-
mitted. We set the audit frequency (T ) to 1 second, then throttle our workload script to
generate variable levels of logs per second. We consider 33 different workload levels ranging
from 1 to 9900 logs/second, repeating each workload level 100 times. The results, shown in
Figure 3.4, confirm that the time to complete a challenge grows linearly with log size.
Another way to evaluate the practicality of our audit challenge is to ask the question
“For a given audit frequency T , at what log size would it take more than T seconds to
complete an audit challenge?” This log size represents the breakdown point of the system,
where audit challenges are now issued with greater frequency than they can be responded
to. Extrapolating from the above test with T set to 1 second, we find that the Logger would
need to generate 145,000 events per second for the processing time of an audit to exceed 1
second. We therefore conclude that our audit challenges are practical for even the most
extreme workloads.
Decentralized Auditing We now use our distributed setup to evaluate our decentralized
auditing protocol. As the cost of an individual audit challenge is identical in both the
centralized and decentralized variants, we here turn our attention to the frequency at which
each node is audited in a realistic Custos’ deployment. To this end, we run Custos on
a cluster of N = 100 nodes, each with an auditing interval of T = 10 s, replication factor
r = 1 and a fixed number of challenges per round w. We instrument nodes to initiate their
first audits at uniform offsets of T to smooth the network impact. We then capture the


























Figure 3.5: Cumulative distribution function of the frequency at which nodes are audited with
varying w. Results are based on a 100-node network over 10 minutes of observation, with T=10 s.
Table 3.6: Size of protocol messages in our Custos’ implementation.




Log Block 76 + 4 · number of logs + size of (logs)
the experiment with w = [1, 2, 4]. Finally, for each challenge received by the each node, we
compute the time passed since the same node received the last challenge.
Figure 3.5 shows the results as a cumulative distribution function. Intuitively, when w
increases, the frequency at which nodes in the network are audited also increases. With
w = 4, 98.4% of the challenges were received within 10 s of receiving the last challenge, and
in the worst case it took only 27.96 s for a node to be audited. Another way to interpret
these numbers is that in 98.4% of the cases it took less than 10 s to audit and replicate a
node’s logs, and in 100% of the cases less it took less than 27.96 s.
Network Cost Finally, we evaluate the network impact of auditing at higher frequencies.
In the above experiment, each node produced approximately 19,200 events (7 MB) of log
data, for a total of 1,920,000 events (700 MB) of log data across the 100 nodes. Let 700 MB
be our baseline for comparison, as this would be the network cost for streaming logs to a
centralized server without Custos. With Custos and w set to 1, each node completed a
total of 60 audit challenges for a total of 6,000 challenges completed system-wide. Factoring
in the size of Custos’ protocol messages, given in Table 3.6, Custos’ total network cost
for these 6,000 challenges was 711 MB (1.5% overhead). However, in the experiments with
w set to 2 and 4, Custos’ network cost was just 714 MB (2% overhead) and 719 MB (2.7%
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overhead), respectively. The reason for this extremely gradual increase in cost is that the
same number of log messages are transmitted in each scenario. Increasing the frequency of
challenges only incurs the additional overhead of Custos’ small protocol messages, which
are dominated by the baseline cost of log transmission.
Based on this result, it is clear that challenge frequency imposes no meaningful difference
in network cost. More challenges simply decrease the size of the average log block and
probabilistically reduce the time before each block is replicated (cf. Section 3.7.1). Because
of this, it is to the advantage of the administrator to use many audit challenges (T and w)
when deploying Custos; doing so will verify and replicate logs sooner with minimal increase
in network cost. Note that modifying the replication factor r would increase the network
cost due to the larger amount of log data to transmit. This increase in network (and storage)
requirements reflects the cost that must be paid for a stronger assurance of tamper-resistance
against a distributed adversary.
3.9 DISCUSSION
Value of Custos after full system compromise This work considers a powerful anti-
forensic adversary that has gained full control of the system, reflecting the common capa-
bilities of system intruders (see, e.g., [19, 18, 20, 21]). Against this adversary, ensuring the
correctness of all log events indefinitely is not practical; after full system compromise, no
security measure can prevent the attacker from controlling which events are logged. Nonethe-
less, Custos provides an invaluable property—the intruder is unable to edit or remove ev-
idence of their methods of entry onto the system, reconnaissance tactics prior to escalating
privilege, and their method of privilege escalation. This information may implicate another
node in the network or lead to the discovery of a zero day exploit, which are valued at tens
of thousands of dollars [127] and are thus zealously guarded by attackers. Most importantly,
these events are suspicious and may lead to immediate detection when Custos is paired
with a Threat Detection System (e.g., [35]) or log analysis mechanism (e.g., [12]). Custos
forces the attacker into a no-win situation in which they must either immediately erase this
evidence (ensuring detection) or permit it to be analyzed by the TDS (risking detection).
Integrity of Centralized Logging Architectures Among existing solutions to tamper-
evident logging, the most practical is streaming all logs to a centralized server. The security
model for such architectures assumes that the log server is fully trusted. While an argument
could be made that the log server can be hardened against attack, we do not find this to
be a convincing solution to the tamper-evident logging problem. Log management utilities
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are complex software; there is no reason to believe that these artifacts do not also contain
zero day exploits that could be identified by well-funded attackers. Further, while we are
not aware of any documented cases of log server compromise, given the general strategies
of lateral movement and anti-forensics associated with APTs, it seems highly likely that log
servers are the target of frequent attack once perimetral defenses are breached.
Adaptive Attack Strategies If the methods presented in this work are deployed in
practice, we must conservatively assume that the intruder would adopt an optimal strategy
for evading detection. Because Custos probabalistically guarantees detection in the event
of tampering, the attacker will not attempt to erase logs until they have completed their
mission objective, at which point they can erase the logs at minimal cost. This strategy
underscores the importance of pairing the Custos Logger with our decentralized auditing
strategy, which redundantly stores evidence on additional nodes in the system. Further, this
attack strategy demonstrates the importance of deploying Custos alongside other security
products such as Threat Detection Systems and log analysis mechanisms [12]. Again, our
ultimate goal in designing Custos is to create a “lose-lose” situation for the attackers,
forcing them to choose between a covert strategy and an anti-forensic strategy.
Diagnosing Benign Faults Finally, one limitation of Custos is that it cannot differ-
entiate benign power failures or crashes from protocol termination attacks, creating the
possibility for false intrusion alerts. Ideally, out-of-band information, such as telemetry data
from power distribution units, will allow administrators to differentiate the two scenarios.
3.10 SUMMARY
In spite of the central importance of system logs in responding to modern security incidents
such as Advanced Persistent Threats, today’s commodity operating systems fail to assure
the integrity of system logs beyond the use of typical access controls. Custos is the first
tamper-evident logging solution that supports practical operating system constraints. It can
be used in enterprise environments to detect, and even prevent, the anti-forensic activities of
system intruders. Custos thus demonstrates a realistic path forward to achieving tamper-
evident auditing on commodity operating systems.
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Chapter 4: In-Memory Attacks and Defenses on System Auditing Frameworks
In the previous chapter we introduced Custos, a system which can securely record log
events and detect any subsequent tampering with them. However, Custos shares a consid-
erable limitation with prior secure logging approaches, in that it commits log events to the
secure log only at the moment when they are processed by the user space logging framework.
In this chapter, we show that this limitation leads to a subtle race-condition vulnerability
affecting existing system logging frameworks and present KennyLoggings, the first system
which protects logs from such vulnerability. The goal of KennyLoggings is to guarantee
tamper-evidence for log events upon their generation. Custos and KennyLoggings can
thus be paired up to secure log events from the moment of their generation all the way up
to the moment of an audit.
4.1 THE DANGER ZONE: ASYNCHRONOUS LOGGING
In this section, we present and validate a covert attack on commodity operating system
logging frameworks. Let us assume that an administrator has configured the logging frame-
work to record a variety of system calls such as process exec and file open. We consider
an adversary that is capable of entering the machine, escalating privilege, and ultimately
disabling the logging framework after fully compromising the system. Wary of this threat,
the administrator has taken the precaution of using a tamper-evident or tamper-resistant
logging framework. Thus, the administrator believes that the preliminary stages of any at-
tack, including the initial intrusion and subsequent privilege escalation, can be audited. To
reflect that a secure logging safeguard is in place, we will assume that a log event is “safe” the
moment it is ingested for processing by the user space logging framework. This assumption
is extremely conservative in that it does not consider the overheads and latencies required
to record the event in a tamper-evident or tamper-resistant fashion. Thus, in practice the
window for the attack we describe is much larger.
4.1.1 Logging Race Condition
For performance reasons, asynchronous message passing paradigms are pervasively used in
commodity operating systems, including their logging frameworks. When a process invokes
a system call, the kernel thread working on its behalf traverses an audit hook that creates
a record of the system call which is then enqueued onto a buffer of log events. A separate
33






marked by syscall xn Event mi is processed
mi is vulnerable
Figure 4.1: Audit records describing an attack are vulnerable due to the latency introduced by
asynchronous logging. In this timeline, the log record mi is vulnerable because the time between
xi’s execution and mi’s processing (δ(xi,mi)) extends past the moment that the attacker fully
compromises the system.
kernel thread is responsible for transmitting these events to user space for processing. An
example of this workflow is given for Linux Audit in Figure 2.1. It is important to note that
it is almost essential that this workflow be asynchronous, as synchronous transmission of
events at a system call by system call granularity would have a devastating impact on the
performance of the operating system.
We observe that asynchronous logging creates a race condition vulnerability—actions as-
sociated with an ongoing attack are permitted to proceed before their events are securely
processed by the logging framework and recorded to the log. We formally define this vulner-
ability using the timeline given in Figure 4.1. Let us consider an individual attack-related
action, the system call xi, which occurs at time ti. The call xi is just one event in a sequence
of attack-related actions between the beginning of the attack at t1 and the full compromise
of the system at tn. The “logging latency” for this syscall, denoted δ(xi,mi), is the time
between action xi and its event mi being ingested by the user space logger. If ti + δ(xi,mi)
exceeds tn (i.e., the time that mi would have been logged comes after the time of full
compromise), then mi is potentially vulnerable to tampering. In fact, if mi is potentially
vulnerable to tampering, then any events generated from actions between time ti and tn are
also potentially vulnerable.
4.1.2 Vulnerability Characterization
A variety of system factors might affect whether or not an attack trace is vulnerable. It
may be that, in practice, the logging latency is so negligible that all events in the attack
trace are secure. This is especially likely in the case that the machine is in a quiescent state.
Alternatively, at the start of the attack there may be unrelated log events in the buffer due to
other system activity. Since the events in the buffer are processed by the logging framework
in a first-in-first-out manner, these unrelated events could create a backlog that increases the















Burst Size [number of syscalls]
Figure 4.2: Latency to log a single event under different system loads. We measure δ(xi,mi)
for a system call executed after bursts of sizes 0, 50, 100 and 250 system calls, respectively. The
results are computed over 200 repetitions. The logging latency grows larger when the system load
is larger.
we hypothesize that system load is the most impactful; in this section, we experimentally
validate this hypothesis and characterize the conditions (system loads) under which the race
condition vulnerability may be triggered by the attacker.
Experimental Methodology We perform our experiments on Linux Audit, the de-facto
standard system logging framework on Linux (cf. Section 2). We instrument the kauditd
component of Linux Audit to record the execution time of each system call and the auditd
component to record the time the associated event is received in user space, allowing us to
conservatively calculate δ(xi,mi). We model the system load as a burst of N system calls
executed serially by a script with configurable N . We then measure the latency δ(xi,mi) for
events executed after a burst. The purpose of the burst is to model the fact that the logging
buffer may be non-empty when the adversary begins their attack. Because we are only
interested in a snapshot of the system state immediately before the attack, it is immaterial
how the buffer is filled (whether by a quick burst of system calls or by events accumulated
over time). To simplify our experimental design and to better isolate our experiments from
system factors we cannot control, we thus choose to model the system load as a burst.
Experimental Setup We perform our experiments on a bare-metal server with 8 logical
CPU cores (4.20 GHz Intel Core i7-7700K) and 64 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu Server 16.04
64 bit (Linux 4.4.0-116). We configure Linux Audit to log all forensically-relevant system
calls (using the same ruleset employed in [1, 115, 116]), and use a large buffer capacity of 220
events (so that it does not fill up during our experiments). For our burst implementation,


























Figure 4.3: Latency to log 100 events under different system loads. The results are aggregated
over 200 repetitions. Again, the the logging latency grows larger when the system load is larger.
For example, when the burst size is 100, only 1% of the log trace was logged within 95 ms.
is non-blocking (i.e., it does not wait on a response from the disk or network) and it also
does not have any arguments that need to be processed, minimizing the time between the
system call invocation and a new log event being created. Further, getuid generates short
log events, making our analysis of logging latency conservative for a given burst size.
Experimental Results Our first experiment measures δ(xi,mi) for a single system call
xi after a burst of size N . We execute a burst of N consecutive system calls followed by
xi, and then measure the latency δ(xi,mi) of logging xi. The results are shown in Figure
4.2. In idle conditions (N = 0), the median logging latency is 25 ms. After a burst of size
N = 100, the median logging latency is 111 ms. Most notably, after a burst of size N = 250,
the median logging latency is 230 ms. These results confirm our hypothesis that the logging
latency grows with the system load.
Next, we measure δ(xi,mi) for an attack trace of K system calls executed after a burst
of size N . That is, we execute a burst of N consecutive system calls followed by K system
calls 〈x1, ..., xK〉, and then measure the latency δ(xi,mi) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K. In particular,
we pick K = 100 to model an attack trace composed of 100 system calls. Figure 4.3 reports
the aggregated results over 200 runs. Under idle conditions (N = 0), 82% of the trace was
logged within 100 ms. Conversely, when the burst size was N = 100, less than 2% of the
trace was logged within 100 ms.
The cause of these behaviors is the larger backlog of events that are queued in the buffer
after a burst. That is, since the events in the buffer are processed one by one and in a
FIFO manner, the latency of logging new events will be affected by the number of events
in the buffer. We established this by measuring the size of the logging buffer immediately
after executing bursts of different sizes and observed that it was in fact larger when N was
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larger. This means that the rate at which events are appended to the buffer during a burst
is larger than the rate at which auditd can process them. We refer the reader to prior work
for further explanation of the performance bottlenecks in Linux Audit [128].
4.1.3 Intercepting A Vulnerable Attack Trace
Recall that the goal of our adversary is to leave no traces of their intrusion in the log. In
the previous section, we discussed what makes an individual log event and an entire attack
trace of K log events vulnerable. We saw that if the load is high enough, the logging latency
is non-negligible. However, we have not talked about how the adversary can intercept and
suppress vulnerable log events in practice. This operation is crucial to the intrusion and
needs to be executed immediately after achieving full system compromise, to prevent the
logging framework from processing any subset of the attack trace.
Suppose that the adversary has just gained root access and that the attack trace is still
vulnerable (i.e., its events have not been logged yet). One possible approach for the adversary
to prevent the vulnerable attack trace from being logged consists of force killing the logger
process immediately after full compromise. This would successfully prevent events currently
in the buffer from being processed. However, previous work has shown that this type of
tampering can be detected because it will force the logger to skip its shutdown routine and
that will raise an alert [37]. Furthermore, killing the logger process would prevent benign
events from being logged as well, which would create a suspicious hole in the log file.
To remain stealthy and undetected, an astute adversary will instead attempt to intercept
only log events related to the intrusion and their subsequent exfiltration, keeping the logging
system running not to raise any alerts. An adversary could achieve these goals by seizing
control of the kernel buffer and preventing any events describing their actions from being
logged, while letting benign events proceed as normal. In the next section, we will describe
and evaluate a proof-of-concept implementation of this approach.
4.1.4 Exploit Evaluation
In this section, we set out to determine whether an adversary can exploit the race condi-
tion vulnerability in practice. We consider two attack scenarios of varying difficulty for the
adversary. The first is a local attacker who already has non-privileged access to the system,
reflecting an insider threat or an adversary who has obtained out-of-band access to creden-
tials. We intend for this scenario to be more favorable to the adversary because the first
suspicious act they commit will be privilege escalation, reducing the size (in log events) of
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Table 4.1: Results of log-interceptor after a local attack. We run the remote attack followed by
log-interceptor under different system loads, and report the median over 100 runs. A burst of 100
system calls preceding the attack is sufficient for log-interceptor to conceal the entire attack trace.





the attack footprint. In addition, we also consider a remote attacker who has no prior access
to the system. This attacker must establish a foothold on the machine by exploiting an
Internet-facing service (e.g., a web server) and dropping to shell before escalating privilege,
increasing the attack footprint.
Attack Implementation We implement two existing exploits on Linux and pair them
up with a log-interceptor, a new tool which seizes control of the kernel buffer to remove
compromise-related events before they are processed by the logging framework. For the local
privilege escalation, we exploit CVE-2017-16995 [129], which allows an unprivileged user to
run code as root on the machine. For the remote code execution we exploit CVE-2014-
6271 [130] (also known as “Shellshock”), a vulnerability of the Unix Bash Shell which can
be used to run arbitrary commands on a remote machine. The remote adversary achieves
remote privilege escalation by combining these two exploits. That is, we let the remote
exploit vector be an apache2 web server that uses Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts
written in Bash to handle requests. The remote adversary will then issue a curl command
to the web server with the exploit payload (the code for the local privilege escalation and
the Bash commands to run it) embedded in the user agent string. As in the prior section,
we model the load prior to an attack as a burst of N system calls.
We implement a proof-of-concept log-interceptor as a kernel module targeted against Linux
Audit. When this kernel module is loaded, it performs the following operations:
1. Retrieve the address of kauditd’s events buffer queue. This is done using the function
kallsyms lookup name.
2. Empty the kauditd buffer queue, discarding all the events contained in it.
Our implementation of log interceptor consists of only 32 lines of C code (excluding Makefiles,
comments, blank lines). In both of our attacks, we embed the compiled log interceptor
module directly in the privilege escalation binary.
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Table 4.2: Results of log-interceptor after a remote attack. We run the remote attack followed
by log-interceptor, under different system loads. We report the median over 100 runs. A burst of 0
system calls preceding the attack is nearly enough for log-interceptor to conceal the entire attack
trace.





Experimental Setup We use the same experimental setup as in Section 4.1.2 but replace
the default Unix Bash Shell with version 4.2 (to make the system vulnerable to CVE-2014-
6271), and introduce an apache2 web server (version 2.4.18) using CGI to serve requests.
We ensure that the vulnerable system is idle prior to the execution of each experiment,
except for the artificial bursts we discussed above. We issue the remote attack request from
a separate bare-metal server, with an average latency of 452 µs between the two machines.
Experimental Results First, we measure how many log events each attack generates
under our extensive logging setup. We observe that the local attack leveraging CVE-2017-
16995 consists of 25 forensically-relevant system calls, all generating relatively short log
messages (averaging 182.6 bytes). On the other hand, the remote attack that uses both
CVE-2017-16995 and CVE-2014-6271 consists of 176 forensically-relevant system calls, the
first of which are large log events (up to 13.9 kilobytes) related to the parsing of the malicious
User-Agent string. In receiving a CGI request our web server also generates 60 benign system
calls, prior to parsing the malicious user agent string. We do not consider these system
calls as part of the attack trace, because they do not contain information incriminating the
attacker. As a consequence, the remote attack benefits from both an intrinsic benign burst
that is generated prior to attack execution, and an increased logging latency due to the
larger size of the log events to process.
Next, we analyze what percentage of each attack trace can be erased by the log-interceptor
under varying system loads. For the local attack, we first run serially a burst of N system
calls, the privilege escalation exploit, and the log-interceptor, then analyze how many of the
forensically-relevant system calls of the privilege escalation attack were logged. Table 4.1
reports the median results over 100 runs for the local attack. As expected, the adversary
has greater probability of intercepting the attack trace when the system load (and thus the
logging latency) is larger. We observe that a burst of 100 system calls is always enough for
the adversary to be able to intercept 100% of the attack trace. For the remote attack, we run
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serially a burst of N system calls, the remote code execution attack, the privilege escalation
attack and the log-interceptor, and then analyze how many of the forensically-relevant system
calls of the remote code execution and privilege escalation attacks were logged. Table 4.2
reports the median results over 100 runs for the remote attack. Surprisingly, we find that a
burst size of 0 (idle state) is sufficient for the attacker to conceal 99% of the attack trace, and
a burst of 50 syscalls (which could be generated, for example, by issuing a benign request just
before the malicious one) is enough to conceal 100% of the attack trace. This is because, as
we noted above, the web server being exploited in the remote attack generated an additional
burst of benign system calls when processing web requests, increasing the logging latency.
Another way to evaluate the practicality of our race condition exploit is to ask the question
“Under what system load can an adversary compromise a host without leaving any log traces
related to their intrusion?” From the above results, we conclude that a remote attacker can
compromise a host even in the absence of any additional system load. Contrary to our
intuition, this suggests that remote exploitation of this vulnerability is highly practical due
to logging noise generated by web applications.
4.2 DOES PRIOR WORK OFFER A DEFENSE?
In the previous section we described a new attack that allows an adversary to compromise a
system without leaving any trace on the system logs. In this section, we discuss why existing
solutions for tamper-evident or tamper-resistant logging cannot protect against such an
adversary. Further, we explore design solutions that can defend against the perils described
above.
Commercial Solutions In industry, log integrity is typically addressed by writing events
to a trusted storage device [131, p. 69]. This could be local, such as a Write-Once-Read-Many
(WORM) drive [23, 132, 133], or remote, such as a centralized log server [134, 25, 135, 26].
Unfortunately, these approaches are insufficient to protect against the attack we present
above. On Linux, these approaches would be implemented in user space by reconfiguring
the logger to write events to a different interface; our attack targets the kernel log event buffer
and therefore preempts these protections. For the same reason, recent work that provides
secure logging via Intel SGX [37, 36] is not an effective defense because SGX supports only
Ring 3 (user space) execution. It is also worth noting that we have presented just one variant
of the asynchronous logging attack; similar attacks also exist at other layers of the system,
such as user space queues and I/O queues at the storage or network interface, such that
these solutions actually increase the attack surface of the logging framework.
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Cryptographic Solutions The literature features many cryptographic solutions to the
log integrity problem [27, 59, 28, 60, 29, 30, 31, 63, 32]. Implementing any such schemes in
user space would not defend against our attack for the same reason that commercial solutions
are insufficient, so we will instead consider their eligibility for inclusion in the kernel. As
single moderately loaded hosts can produce millions of system calls per second [38], the
commitment speed of generated log events is the paramount performance consideration in
this use case. Schemes based on asymmetric cryptography [29, 30, 31, 63, 32] are therefore
not practical in this domain. We similarly dismiss cryptographic data structures such as
history trees [33, 34] and hash treaps [34], where insertion speed is a function of log size (i.e.,
non-constant complexity). The most compatible approaches seem to be earlier work based
on symmetric cryptography, such as [27, 59, 28, 60, 29]. However, to date these approaches
have not been considered for operating systems; in the kernel, extreme performance demands
may render even the most computationally efficient schemes unusable.
4.3 DEFENSE DESIGN
In light of the inability of prior work to defend against our asynchronous logging attack,
we now present the design of an effective and practical solution for assured log integrity.
4.3.1 Threat Model And Assumptions
The adversary we consider here is a sophisticated adversary akin to an Advanced Persistent
Threat [13]; namely, after some initial compromise or credential theft grants non-privileged
access to a host, the attacker will establish persistence and then escalate privilege, ultimately
leading to a full system compromise that grants access to kernel memory and privileged code
execution. We assume that each phase of this attack requires interaction with the system’s
relevant software layers; as a result, the “attack footprint” will require many system calls that
are being traced by the system’s audit framework. However, after escalating privilege, the
attacker can engage in anti-forensic countermeasures such as log tampering [20, 21, 19, 18]
to conceal their presence, as well as their methods of entry and privilege escalation.
Outside of the compromised host, we assume the presence of a trusted auditor, which
can verify the integrity of the log. Further, we assume that the machine under attack
is trusted prior to full system compromise; that is, the machine’s software and hardware
are distributed and configured in a correct state. Physical attackers who tamper with the
internal functionality of the machine are considered out of scope for this work. Similarly,
side channel attacks which may leak secrets about kernel memory (e.g., [136]) lie outside our
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threat model. We also assume that erased keys cannot be recovered after their deletion from
the host’s memory. Lastly, we make the standard cryptographic assumptions that it is not
feasible for an adversary to forge message authentication codes (MACs) or find collisions in
cryptographic hash functions.
4.3.2 Design Goals
In light of the perils we present above, we set out to design an auditing framework that
satisfies the following properties:
G1 Tamper-Evident Logging. Our system must generate logs with provable integrity
such that forgeries, omissions, and other forms of tampering can be detected in an
audit. Specifically, if a message mi was committed to the log at time ti, an audit
should be able to verify that no message was added, removed, or modified between
times 0 and ti. This goal is consistent with prior work, assuring that our solution
exposes the same basic functionality as existing secure logging solutions.
G2 Synchronous Integrity. Our system must assure that any event that occurs on the
system is associated with a tamper-evident log entry for as long as the kernel is in a
correct state. Specifically, if tn is the moment of full system compromise, audits must
be able to verify the integrity of all events xi for all times ti ≤ tn. This goal is distinct
from prior work—rather than guarantee the tamper-evidence upon the commitment of
message mi to the log, our system must guarantee the tamper-evidence of mi upon the
occurrence of xi.
G3 Tamperproof Mechanism. Our solution must be secure in the face of the extremely
powerful root-level adversary described in our threat model. G1 and G2 must hold for
past events against an attacker that has gained unrestricted access to kernel memory
and Ring 0 code execution.
G4 Practical Performance. Our system must not adversely impact the performance
or correctness of commodity auditing frameworks. These frameworks already suffer
from high performance overheads [128] making the introduction of additional latency
perilous. Our system must be demonstrably efficient under realistic deployments.
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4.3.3 Design Challenges
Protecting against our powerful adversary is challenging without trading off performance.
To solve it with traditional solutions based on trusted storage devices, logging would need
to become a synchronous, proactive operation. That is, each system call xi would need to
be securely written to disk before the any other system call xj (with tj > ti) is allowed
to proceed. However, even the fastest communication mechanisms between the kernel and
user space would cause impractically large overheads on high frequency system logging, not
satisfying G4 An alternative, more practical defense mechanism could be to reduce the race
condition rather than eliminate it. For example, the logging latency could be reduced by
having multiple threads ingesting logs in the user space logger instead of a single thread.
However, while such a solution would raise the bar for an adversary to carry out a successful
attack, it would still not satisfy G2; further, its security guarantees depend on additional
system overheads, which would not be practical for servers under high utilization.
The key challenge to achieving these goals is that tamper evidence needs to be provided to
events related to all actions executed while the host is being compromised, namely between
compromise initiation and full compromise in Figure 4.1 (cf. G2). To our knowledge, we are
the first to address this challenge in the context of operating system logging.
4.3.4 KennyLoggings: In-Kernel Log Integrity
We now introduce KennyLoggings, the first tamper-evident logging system which pro-
tects logs from the race-condition vulnerability described above. Our system satisfies the
necessary design goals under the given threat model by introducing a tamper-evidence layer
inside of kernel space that operates synchronously with the execution of system calls.
The key insight behind KennyLoggings is that past approaches falter because they
cryptographically commit events at the moment they are logged (stored); referring back
to Figure 4.1, this means that commitment has traditionally occurred on the far right of
the timeline when event mi is processed. KennyLoggings addresses this limitation by
decoupling commitment and logging, instead committing events as they occur (e.g., when
attack-related syscall xi executes). Thus, while the logging latency δ(xi,mi) remains un-
changed, an attacker attempting to exploit this race condition using the method described
above will be detected during an audit.
Tamper-Evident Logging Protocol To satisfy G1, we first require a log event commit-
ment protocol that facilitates tamper-evident audits. Because our threat model considers
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an adversary who can completely compromise the system and hence read any keys from
its memory, we need a protocol which provides forward security. Forward security is the
property that an adversary that gains access to a cryptographic secret at time tn will be
unable to forge integrity proofs generated at times prior to tn, which in this case means
that the integrity proofs for past log events withstand forgery after compromise. Recall that
corruption of past log events is a central goal of the adversary, as these events include vital
forensic evidence pertaining to the intrusion.
As we mention in Section 4.2, there is expansive prior work on the development of tamper-
evident logging protocols, but such schemes are largely divorced from the operational require-
ments of operating systems, specifically when considering the speed of log event generation.
To account for this requirement, we select the fastest of these schemes—forward secure mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC), previously used in [59, 29]. This scheme lacks many of
the advancements of subsequent work (e.g., public verifiability, aggregate authentication),
but its efficiency makes it ideally-suited for kernel space. The protocol begins with a shared
secret key, known to both the logger and the auditor. To achieve forward security, the key
used by the logger to generate integrity proofs evolves over time, and expired keys are se-
curely deleted from memory. Further, the key update mechanism is a one-way function, so
that an adversary who learns the current signing key cannot recover past signing keys and
forge proofs for past events.
Our protocol exposes the following four functions:
• KeyGen : 1λ → {0, 1}λ. Given security parameter 1λ, generate an initial λ-bit signing
key k1.
• KeyUpdate : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ. Given the i-th signing key ki, generate the (i + 1)-th
signing key ki+1 = H(ki), where H is a collision resistant one-way hash function.
• Sign : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. Given a λ-bit key ki and an arbitrary length message
m, compute a l-bit tag (integrity proof). The tag is generated using as a standard
message authentication code (MAC) algorithm.
• Verify : {0, 1}λ × [(m1, p1), . . . , (mn, pn)] → {0, 1}. Given an initial signing key k1 and
a list of message-tag pairs, first derive the key sequence k1, . . . , kn. If pi = Sign(ki,mi)
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Notice that, unlike [59], which permits several log entries to be committed with the same
signing key, our protocol updates the key for each log event (this is necessary to achieve
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Figure 4.4: KennyLoggings workflow for committing log events, with the novel component
shaded in yellow. Integrity proofs are generated synchronously by the kernel thread before returning
control to the application invoking the system call.
encryption is that it breaks interoperability with upstream applications that analyze log
data (e.g., [35]). With our solution, we are able to provide an identical external interface as
the original commodity audit framework.
Integration into the Operating System KennyLoggings instatiates the tamper-
evident logging protocol inside of kernel space, synchronously committing log events as
they are created. The general workflow for our solution is given in Figure 4.4, which we
will describe here with respect to our Linux Audit implementation: 1) an application first
invokes a (loggable) system call xi, prompting a control transfer to kernel space; 2) a kernel
thread executes the call and then passes through an audit filter hook (see Figure 2.1),
creating an event mi; 3) within the audit subsystem beneath the audit filter hook (still
in the same kernel thread), we introduce a cryptographic commitment of event mi that is
appended to the log message; 4) the extended message mi is appended to the log buffer to
be asynchronously consumed by the kauditd thread.
Integrating KennyLoggings in a multi-threaded operating system requires additional
consideration. Since KennyLoggings’ tamper evident logging protocol uses a new signing
key for each log event, we must enforce that each key is used only once. Furthermore, we
must ensure that logger and verifier agree on the ordering of signing keys and respective log
events. If this property did not hold, and log events were received by the verifier in an order
different from the one at which they were signed, the verifier would not be able to match the
key sequence to them, and the proofs of integrity would be useless. To ensure that each key is
used only once, KennyLoggings runs its commitment operations in a critical section that
assures mutual exclusion for event commitment. Additionally, KennyLoggings’ critical
section envelopes the existing critical section used by kauditd to prevent concurrent access
to the log buffer, and is thus a natural extension to existing commodity audit frameworks.
The advantage of this approach is that the order at which events are signed is the same
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/∗ Compute proof of integrity ∗/
integrity proof = Sign(log msg, signing key);
/∗ Update key ∗/
signing key = KeyUpdate(signing key);
/∗ Add proof of integrity to log event ∗/
log msg = log msg + ” p=” + integrity proof;
/∗ Append the log event to the logging buffer ∗/
append(backlog buffer, log msg);
Listing 4.1: Pseudocode of KennyLoggings’ critical section. This code executes in the kernel of
the operating system each time a log event is generated after system call execution. It corresponds
to Steps 4 and 5 of Figure 4.4, which are executed atomically to ensure that the order at which
events are signed is the same as the order at which they are logged.
as the order at which events are appended to the log buffer, thus serializing concurrent
activity in the system. However, this approach has also potential performance challenges,
as it increases the latency required for the kernel to append an event to the log buffer; we
demonstrate in Section 4.6 that this added latency is manageable.
The logic for KennyLoggings’ extended critical section is given as pseudocode in Listing
4.1. These lines correspond to Steps 4○ and 5○ of Figure 4.4, and their performance is crucial
in that it impacts the execution time of each (loggable) system call executed on the host. In
particular, the operations added by KennyLoggings correspond to the Sign and KeyUpdate
functions of our tamper-evident logging protocol.
Optimization: Precomputation of Signing Keys Forward secure message authenti-
cation codes (MAC) allow for highly efficient implementations of the Sign and KeyUpdate
functions, which are crucial given that KennyLoggings inserts these into the critical sec-
tion of the auditing subsystem. Nonetheless, these functions introduce non-negligible latency
to log event generation, which is concerning in light of the fact that thousands of events per
second can be generated during bursts of system activity. To reduce the overhead of Ken-
nyLoggings, we identify the following opportunity to optimize its performance—signing
keys may be pre-computed as long as they are securely deleted after use.
We extend KennyLoggings to support pre-computation of keys as follows. In place of
a single signing key, we introduce two sets of signing keys that are populated during system
initialization. At runtime, when the first set is exhausted, KennyLoggings immediately
rotates to the second and requests a background thread to repopulate the empty set. The
size of each set is parameterizable; in our implementation we store 100,000 keys per set
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at a time. The background thread is able to execute asynchronously and does not require
access to the critical section from Step 4○ above in order to operate. Because in practice
the precomputation of keys is much faster than KennyLoggings’s consumption of keys,
this optimization effectively eliminates the performance cost of KeyUpdate from the audit
subsystem’s logging routine. We argue for the security of this optimization in Section 4.5
and quantify its effect on system performance in Section 4.6.
Initialization, Verification and Shutdown The deployment and usage models for Ken-
nyLoggings are highly similar to past tamper-evident logging schemes. At initialization, a
system administrator configures the machine with a shared secret, generated using KeyGen,
that is used as the initial signing key. This secret is securely kept by the system adminis-
trator, who can later use it to perform a tamper-evident audit of the logs. During an audit,
the auditor receives the sequence of signed log entries from the KennyLoggings-enabled
host and uses them as input to the Verify function together with the initial shared secret.
Upon system shutdown, the current signing key is sealed to the host configuration using
standard TPM functionalities [61], allowing the host to unseal the key following a correct
boot sequence.
4.4 IMPLEMENTATION
We implement KennyLoggings on the Linux kernel, version 4.15.0-47, using the stan-
dard Audit subsystem [40] (cf. Section 2.2). We concretely instantiate the tamper-evident
logging protocol with fast symmetric primitives, namely the BLAKE2 cryptographic hash
function [137] for KeyUpdate and the SipHash pseudorandom function [138], which uses
128-bit keys, for Sign. The KeyGen operation is implemented using the get random bytes
function (suitable for key generation), and keys are securely erased by overwriting (or ze-
roizing, in case of precomputed keys [139]) their data structures in memory after use. Of the
existing kernel source code, we modify the functions audit init, which initializes the kernel
components of Linux Audit at system startup, and audit log end, which is executed at the
conclusion of system call execution to append the log event to kauditd’s kernel buffer, if the
system call needed to be logged.
The code of the modified audit log end function (without the key pre-computation op-
timization) is shown in Listing 4.2. The existing critical section of audit log end, imple-
mented using a spinlock, is extended to include the critical section of KennyLoggings.
We implement the precomputation of signing keys as a separate kernel task, scheduled using
a wait queue. To facilitate further experimentation in secure logging, a kernel patch for
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1 void audit log end(struct audit buffer ∗ab) {
2 struct sk buff ∗skb;
3 struct nlmsghdr ∗nlh;
4 unsigned long flags;
5 char ∗log msg;
6 size t log msg len;
7 u64 integrity proof ;
8 size t key len;
9
10 if (!ab) return;
11 if (audit rate check()) {
12 /∗ Get the netlink header and content of skb ∗/
13 nlh = nlmsg hdr(ab−>skb);
14 log msg = nlmsg data(nlh);
15 log msg len = strlen(log msg);
16 key len = sizeof(siphash key t);
17
18 /∗ Enter critical section ∗/
19 spin lock irqsave (&(&audit queue)−>lock, flags);
20
21 /∗ Compute MAC ∗/
22 integrity proof = siphash(log msg, log msg len, &curr signing key);
23
24 /∗ Add MAC to log event ∗/
25 audit log format(ab, ” p=%llx”, integrity proof) ;
26
27 /∗ Update the key ∗/
28 blake2b((uint8 t ∗)&curr signing key, key len,
29 (uint8 t ∗)&curr signing key, key len, NULL, 0);
30
31 /∗ Ready to append log event to buffer ∗/
32 skb = ab−>skb;
33 ab−>skb = NULL;
34
35 /∗ Setup the netlink header length of skb, see the comments in
36 ∗ kauditd send multicast skb() for length quirks ∗/
37 nlh−>nlmsg len = skb−>len − NLMSG HDRLEN;
38
39 /∗ Add the event to the logging buffer ∗/
40 skb queue tail (&audit queue, skb);
41
42 /∗ Exit critical section ∗/
43 spin unlock irqrestore (&(&audit queue)−>lock, flags);
44
45 /∗ Poke the kauditd thread ∗/
46 wake up interruptible(&kauditd wait);
47 } else
48 audit log lost (”rate limit exceeded”);
49
50 audit buffer free (ab);
51 }
Listing 4.2: KennyLoggings’ modifications to the audit log end function in kernel/audit.c.
Prior to returning to user space, this function appends the system call’s log event to kauditd’s
buffer (audit queue in the code). Added lines are red, modified ones blue. The proof is computed
using the SipHash keyed hash function (Line 22), and the key is updated using the BLAKE2b hash
function (Line 28). Error checks are omitted for brevity.

























































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Microbenchmarks on system call latency. We report the median overhead over 100,000
iterations ran on the number of threads reported on the x axis. Due to spin lock contention, the
overhead increases when the thread count increases.
4.5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now consider how KennyLoggings’ design and implementation assure the intended
security and design goals.
With respect to G1, observe that our signing mechanism (SipHash) is a secure message
authentication code. The only way an adversary can forge integrity proofs for past log events
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is to recover expired signing keys. However, because used keys are securely deleted from the
system, and because the chosen key update function is a collision (and preimage) resistant
hash function (Blake2), a signing key residing on the system when compromised cannot be
used to recover prior signing keys. We consider log tampering attacks to KennyLoggings:
• Log Modification. An adversary may not modify log entries without being detected in an
audit. Any modification would cause Verify to fail for the tampered entry.
• Log Deletion. An adversary cannot delete log events from a log stream. Removing any
subset of events from a stream would cause the ordered sequence of keys used to commit
the events not to match the ordered sequence of signed events, causing Verify to fail.
• Log Insertion/Reordering. Similarly, an adversary cannot insert events or reorder log
entries, as this would invalidate the ordering between signing and verification of entries,
causing Verify to fail.
• Log Truncation. Truncation attacks can be detected by checking for a known message
at the end of the log, which can be achieved by having live hosts sign a new message
immediately prior to the audit.
The novel security property in our design is G2, which assures synchronous integrity of
log events. KennyLoggings achieves this goal in implementation through instrumenting
the audit log end function in the audit subsystem. This function is invoked by the kernel
thread responsible for handling the system call while the user space process is still in the
waiting state; the process is thus unable to violate the integrity of the event because it is
suspended. This property also holds in an attack featuring multiple processes/threads; if a
malicious running kernel thread is able to modify or erase the event mi before it reaches the
critical section of audit log end, this implies that the system has already been compromised
and thus the property holds for all events prior to the time tn of full system compromise.
This is a significant security guarantee because events describing how the first malicious
thread violated kernel integrity will be protected. Further, G2 is preserved when keys for
future events are pre-computed because each key is still deleted immediately after use. Even
with our optimization enabled, an attacker will only be able to access keys for events that
occur after tn.
KennyLoggings provides a tamperproof security mechanism (G3) because its runtime
trusted computing base of resides entirely in kernel memory; thus, the attacker must com-
promise the system before they can disable KennyLoggings or forge future events, but by
that point all events prior to tn are committed. During initialization, we make the reasonable
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Table 4.3: Microbenchmarks on KennyLoggings operations. We report the median execution
times over 1000 iterations. For the Sign and Verify operations, we use as input a fixed log message
of length 366 (average length of the remote attack events). For the KeyUpdate operation, we start





assumption that the host is configured in a secure environment (e.g., not yet connected to
the Internet), and thus deployment does not expose an additional attack surface.
Finally, we will show that KennyLoggings satisfies G4 by evaluating its performance
overheads in Section 4.6.
4.6 EVALUATION
We now evaluate the performance of KennyLoggings as compared to the Vanilla (inse-
cure) Linux kernel.
Experimental Setup We use the same experimental setup used in Section 4.1.2, with
the unmodified kernel 4.15.0-47 as baseline for our comparisons. We configure KennyLog-
gings to store two sets of 100,000 precomputed keys, which occupy a total of 3.2 MB.
Note that Linux already consumes several hundred megabytes of memory in idle. Hence,
in our evaluation the memory overhead introduced by storing precomputed keys was hardly
observable.
Microbenchmarks We start with microbenchmarks that capture the raw cost of Kenny-
Loggings’ base functionality. In particular, we measure the time that our implementation
takes to perform each of the four phases described in Section 4.3.4 (KeyGen, Sign, KeyUpdate,
Verify), excluding from the measurement the time spent spinning, waiting to acquire the syn-
chronization lock. We do so by manually invoking each operation 1,000 times and report
the median execution time of each operation in Table 4.3. The phases that we care the
most about are the Sign and KeyUpdate ones, that are executed as many times as there are
log events. For the Sign routine, we observe an average performance of 164 ns per proof.
It should be noted that performance is paramount in this routine since it is invoked syn-
chronously with the execution of a system call. For the KeyUpdate routine, we observe an
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Table 4.4: Application benchmarks results. We run each benchmark 20 times and report the
median values. For all benchmarks besides 7-zip, smaller numbers are better. The first four
benchmarks are I/O-intensive, and incur larger overhead than the last 4 benchmarks, which are
CPU-intensive.
Test Type Vanilla KennyLoggings Overhead
nginx 62.5 µs 67.5 µs 8.00%
apache2 60 µs 65 µs 8.33%
redis 20.5 µs 22.2 µs 8.64%
postmark 48 ms 51.5 ms 7.29%
openssl 743 µs 743 µs 0.00%
blast 968.160 s 973.199 s 0.52%
blake2 3.315 cy/B 3.315 cy/B 0.00%
7-zip 27,881 MIPS 27,743 MIPS 0.49%
average performance of 218 ns per key update. That means that the task responsible for
key precomputation will take 21.8 ms to refill the set of precomputed keys when it is woken
up under our experimental configuration. While this operation runs asynchronously in our
implementation, its performance is still important to minimize the amount of additional
resources utilized by KennyLoggings when keys are being pre-computed.
System Call Benchmarks Next, we measure how KennyLoggings affects the time
required to execute individual system calls, when logging is enabled. We first perform this
test running system calls on a single thread. Next, we run system calls on multiple threads, to
catch the effect of the spinlock contention. The results are presented in Figure 4.5. Without
additional contention, KennyLoggings average overhead is below 20%. However, even
when we use all the CPU logical cores, maximizing contention, KennyLoggings’ overhead
on an individual system call remains below 55%. Moreover, while contention increases the
overhead, this overhead could be reduced by using multiple evolving key sequences and
spinlocks.
Application Workloads To evaluate the system-wide impact of KennyLoggings on
realistic workloads, we again use our experimental setup to compare our performance to
the Vanilla kernel on a series of application benchmarks. These benchmarks can be divided
into two categories: the first category of applications are I/O-intensive benchmarks, namely
NGINX [122], apache2 [121], redis [123], and postmark [140]; the second category are CPU-
intensive benchmarks, namely openssl [141], blast [124], blake2 [142], and 7-zip [143]). For
apache2, NGINX and Redis, we use the apache bench and redis-benchmark tools, configured
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Table 4.5: Application benchmarks of KennyLoggings with and without key precomputation.
We run each benchmark 20 times and report the median values. Precomputing keys reduces
KennyLoggings’ overhead by 6% to 9%.
Test Type Unoptimized Optimized Improvement
nginx 74 µs 67.5 µs 8.78%
apache2 70 µs 65 µs 7.14%
redis 23.8 µs 22.2 µs 6.65%
postmark 56.5 ms 51.5 ms 8.85%
to send 30,000 serial requests and measure the average latency per request. For postmark,
we use the built-in benchmark with its default configuration and measure its runtime. For
7-zip, we use the built-in benchmark tool configured to use all CPU cores available and
measure the LZMA compression speed (in Million Instructions Per Second). For openssl, we
use the built-in “speed” benchmark, configured to use all CPU cores available and measure
the time to compute an rsa4096 signature. For blake2 and blast, we use the built-in single-
threaded benchmarks that measure the median performance (in cycles/byte) and runtime,
respectively.
Table 4.4 shows the results. The I/O-intensive benchmarks have the largest overheads at
up to 8.64%. This result is unsurprising in that I/O-based workloads generate more system
calls, leading to the creation of more log events. We argue that this overhead is manageable,
especially when considering the fact that cryptographically-assured integrity is achieved at
the application layer at the cost of just 2 to 5 µs per request to nginx, apache2, and redis. In
contrast, CPU-intensive benchmarks enjoy near-zero overheads due to their lack of syscall
activity. This result demonstrates that our modifications impose negligible overhead on
unrelated kernel functionality.
Key Precomputation Finally, we report on the concrete improvement that precomputing
keys allowed us to achieve, by showing what the performance of the application benchmarks
is without the optimization. Table 4.5 reports the results. We exclude the CPU-intensive
benchmarks because we did not observe any significant difference in their results. That is,
precomputing keys does not incur an observable overhead on the CPU utilization. On the
other hand, the I/O-intensive benchmarks perform 6% to 9% better when KennyLoggings
is configured to use the key precomputation optimization.
Storage Cost The storage overhead of KennyLoggings is fixed, equalling to 19 bytes
per log event. These bytes are necessary to store the proof of integrity of 16 hexadecimal
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characters along with a 3 byte label which is necessary to preserve the semantics of Linux
Audit records. In this way, applications that analyze log records without breaking compat-
ibility; they simply ignore the KennyLoggings-specific field. To put this per-event cost
in context, let us consider that Ma et al. [45] profile a web server under realistic conditions
and observe an average daily rate of 2.76 million Linux Audit events, yielding a log of size
1.02 GB. From a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we extrapolate that the storage cost with
KennyLoggings enabled would add just 52 MB, an overhead of only 5.14%.
4.7 DISCUSSION
Protocol Enhancements KennyLoggings’s tamper evident logging scheme is judi-
ciously optimized for concrete commitment (signing) cost. As a trade-off, it lacks some of
the benefits of other log integrity schemes, such as public verifiability and aggregate authen-
tication. Public verifiability is a desirable property in secure logging schemes because it can
be used to allow third-parties (e.g. Court agents [108, 109]) to verify the authenticity of a
given set of logs without needing access to secret keys. Aggregate authentication is useful
because it provides constant time log verification costs costs for the auditor, independently
of the number of log events in an audit. This property is typically achieved using sequential
aggregate signatures (e.g., [30, 31, 63, 32]) which allow a single signature to attest the in-
tegrity of an entire set of log events. We argue that these techniques are prohibitively costly
for deployment in the critical path of kernel system calls; however, KennyLoggings can
be extended to achieve these properties through the introduction of an intermediate trusted
verifier that operates in the typical asynchronous event commitment model used in prior
work. KennyLoggings would send both its events and proofs to the intermediate verifier,
which would verify that no in-memory log tampering had occurred. The intermediary could
then produce a publicly verifiable sequential aggregate signature over the entire log stream
to improve the performance of subsequent audits. Thus, even when more advanced features
are required, KennyLoggings still plays an important role in establishing a secure chain
of custody for audit logs.
Security-Performance Trade-Offs In KennyLoggings, each integrity proof is gener-
ated using a unique key. Early forward security schemes, such as the one introduced by
Bellare and Yee [59], proposed that keys should evolve over time intervals called “epochs”
(sometimes referred to as “stages”). That is, integrity proofs belonging to the same epoch
are generated using the same key, which is only updated for subsequent epochs. This reduces
the number of key updates required, which can promise further gains in performance. One
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could even imagine generating integrity proofs for a “batch” of log events, further squeezing
performance out of the scheme.
However, we argue that such optimizations unfortunately trade-off security for perfor-
mance. Suppose an attacker compromises a machine at a time nearing the end of an epoch.
Then, the attacker can still forge false integrity proofs for the current epoch, since the cor-
responding signing key has not yet been securely erased from memory. Should the entire
attack trace reside within a single epoch, the attacker could undetectably conceal any forensic
evidence of their intrusion.
Thus, only a one-to-one correspondence between log events, keys, and integrity proofs,
as we have implemented in KennyLoggings, provides the strongest security guarantees,
satisfying G2. Still, one could implement an epoch-based scheme by setting appropriate
parameters (depending on how fast an attacker can intercept log events in practice) while
still maintaining security. Our empirical study of the race condition vulnerability serves as
a first step towards understanding this security-performance trade-off in practice.
4.8 SUMMARY
Existing secure logging systems overlook a race condition vulnerability that renders them
insecure. In particular, they detect log tampering for system events only after they have
been recorded to the secure log. However, in this work, we have shown that a fast at-
tacker can prevent compromise-related events from ever being recorded in the first place.
This vulnerability arises from system calls being logged asynchronously, which introduces a
delay between when system calls execute and when their corresponding events are logged.
To defend against this vulnerability, we have proposed a simple, general solution: move
tamper-evidence mechanisms into the kernel and have them operate synchronously with the
execution of system calls. We implement our solution atop the Linux Audit system, and
demonstrate that these changes introduce less than 10% overhead on audit intensive work-
loads, obviating the need for additional tamper-evidence mechanisms and demonstrating a
viable path forward for audit log integrity.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we revisited the goal of secure logging within the context of standard
operating system abstractions. We developed two new designs that secure the audit pipeline
from the moment of log event generation to its eventual post-mortem inspection. Our first
design, Custos, achieves realtime detection of tampering in system logs within an enterprise-
class network while being minimally invasive to the underlying logging framework and orders
of magnitude faster than prior hardware-based secure logging schemes. Our second design,
KennyLoggings, achieves secure logging from the moment of event’s occurrence within the
kernel. We also presented and validated an in-memory attack on the integrity of auditing
frameworks, and KennyLoggings is the first secure logging scheme resilient to it. We
demonstrate that our systems are practical and minimally invasive to the operating system,
while being able to detect log tampering even in the presence of powerful adversaries.
We will conclude by discussing a generalization of our approaches and directions
for future work. First, Custos and KennyLoggings serve two different purposes—
KennyLoggings secures log events from the in-kernel race condition vulnerability, but
lacks many of Custos’ benefits such as realtime detection of integrity violations and tamper-
resistant logs; vice versa, Custos achieves third party verifiability and realtime tampering
detection, but is vulnerable to the in-kernel race condition vulnerability. Nevertheless, we
argue that KennyLoggings and Custos can be paired up and work together. With min-
imal modifications, Custos can serve as an intermediate verifier for KennyLoggings to
verify that no in-memory log tampering has occurred before proceeding with its efficient
logging and auditing protocols. Finally, beyond secure logging, there remain several open
challenges to quantifying the scope and scale of our results. For example, to what extent
are professional forensic analysts concerned about log integrity, and what security properties
do they seek out the most? Could our systems be extended to provide integrity to network
traces, browsing history, video/audio streams or any forensic data? What are the costs of
integrating our systems into the pipeline of professional forensic analysis software? The
answers to these questions are still unclear.
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